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EDITORIAL: PUSHING FREE SPEECH TOO FAR
The New York Times
July 15, 1996
Burt Neuborne
The current Supreme Court is the fiercest
defender of the First Amendment in the Court's
history. None of the great names in First
Amendment theory -- Holmes, Brandeis, Black,
Douglas, Brennan -- ever sat on a Court so
protective of speech.
Consider what the Supreme Court decided in
the past term alone. It ruled that Rhode Island's
ban on advertising liquor prices violated
commercial free speech. Kansas and Illinois were
told that patronage, the tradition of awarding
government contracts to political supporters,
violated freedom of association. Ceilings on
campaign spending by political parties were
found to violate political free speech. Mandatory
controls on sexually explicit cable programming
were held unconstitutional.
First Amendment arguments prevailed in
every case last term, and in eight of nine cases in
the term before that. So why am I not smiling?
Why am I uneasy just as the Court is accepting
expansive First Amendment arguments that I
.have been making for more than 30 years?
It is not because my commitment to freedom
of speech has lessened. Protection of free speech,
especially by dissenters and the powerless,
remains the Court's most important duty. The
recent lower court decision barring government
censorship of the Internet is exactly on target. I
am troubled because the First Amendment is
increasingly being used to reinforce
concentrations of private power. The current
Court cannot seem to distinguish between
government efforts to censor speech and
government efforts to regulate private power.
At the beginning of the century, when vast
wealth was being used to mass produce tangible
goods, the Supreme Court declared early laws
regulating the minimum wage, maximum
workweek, child labor and product safety
unconstitutional because they interfered with
private property and freedom of contract. Only
the Great Depression forced the Court to retreat,
and the earlier damage was subsequently undone
both by future justices and Congress.
As we move toward the 21st century, vast
wealth is being used to mass-produce not only
tangible goods but information. The First
Amendment is being deployed by this Court to
block reform, just as property and contract rights
were used at the turn of the century. Consider the
practice of campaign financing and concentration
of media ownership. American democracy has
become a vast feeding farm, where the rich throw
money in a trough and invite selected politicians
to put their snouts in. But the Supreme Court, by
treating money as speech, has virtually doomed
campaign finance reform.
The Court has also used the First
Amendment to reinforce the increasing power of
media barons. To this Court, communications
empires are just high-decibel street-comer
orators. In fact, the modem media empire acts as
a gatekeeper, determining whose speech reaches
the public. The Court should not treat
government efforts to let alternative voices be
heard as violations of the First Amendment.
Allowing government any power over the
process by which speech is produced poses
obvious dangers. But paralyzing government in
the face of concentrations of private power is
even worse. We can prevent democracy from
turning into the domain of the rich without
submitting to government censorship. A good
place to start would be to remind the Supreme
Court that money isn't speech: it's raw power.
There is nothing unconstitutional about curbing
excessive power over any market, especially the
market of ideas.
(Burt Neuborne, director of the Brennan Center
for Justice at New York University Law School,
is former legal director of the American Civil
Liberties Union.)
Copyright 1996 The New York Times Company
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JUSTICES LIMIT STATE'S ABILITY TO CURB ADS
The Wall Street Journal
Tuesday, May 14, 1996
Paul M. Barrett, Staff Reporter
The Supreme Court dealt a blow to
advertising restrictions in a decision that could
make it tougher for the Clinton administration to
curb tobacco ads.
The high court yesterday invalidated a Rhode
Island ban on mentioning prices in liquor
advertisements, saying that the state had violated
the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.
The advertising industry celebrated a victory in
the closely watched case, and its lawyers
predicted that the ruling would make it more
difficult for government to set sweeping limits on
how business promotes products.
"The court set a tough standard for
government to meet if it tries to restrict truthful
advertising for a legal product, even a legal
product that can be abused," said Wallace
Snyder, president of the American Advertising
Federation, a trade group.
Mr. Snyder and other industry officials
focused on language in the main opinion in which
Justice John Paul Stevens emphasized that before
limiting product advertising, regulators must
consider alternatives that don't interfere with free
speech, such as more strictly controlling the use
of the product itself. That could apply to
regulations proposed by the Clinton
administration to curb cigarette smoking among
teenagers by limiting tobacco ads on billboards
and in magazines with young readers, and
banning cigarette billboards near schools and
playgrounds.
Antismoking advocates immediately
responded that the Supreme Court's decision was
tailored to the Rhode Island case and that the
justices had shown displeasure with blanket bans,
not with more limited regulation like the new
rules for cigarette ads proposed by the Food and
Drug Administration. "The FDA rules would
survive because the court seems to have said that
if you tailor this thing to the problem you're
trying to deal with -- kids smoking -- and still
allow some form of advertising expression by the
industry, then you're OK," said Richard Daynard,
an antitobacco activist and law professor at
Northeastern University.
The FDA reacted quickly to yesterday's court
action, maintaining that it wouldn't inhibit the
effort to reduce marketing of cigarettes to young
people.-"Kids can't legally buy cigarettes; the
rules are aimed at preventing temptations for
them to buy cigarettes," said agency spokesman
Jim OHara.
Rhode Island tried to defend its liquor-price
law as a way to cut alcohol consumption. But the
Supreme Court dismissed that argument, saying
that the state was keeping consumers in the dark
about useful information related to a legal
activity. Rhode Island "has presented no evidence
to suggest that its speech prohibition will
significantly reduce marketwide consumption,"
Justice Stevens wrote. The ban might inflate
prices somewhat, but abusive drinkers probably
wouldn't change their behavior, or might simply
cut back on other purchases, Justice Stevens
reasoned.
The liquor-price advertising laws of 11 other
states - Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and South Carolina
-- could be affected by yesterdays ruling.
The Stevens opinion appeared to create a
new, tougher First Amendment standard that
would almost always invalidate blanket bans of a
category of speech related to the marketplace.
But the precise scope of that standard, and
whether it will be used in other cases, was
unclear, since Justice Stevens couldn't command
a majority for his approach. While all nine
justices agreed to strike down the Rhode Island
law, the court splintered over the reasoning for
that conclusion. Justice Stevens wrote the main
opinion, parts of which were joined by various
other justices; Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas and Sandra Day O'Connor wrote
separate opinions.
Advertising and other forms of "commercial
speech" traditionally have received less
constitutional protection than other kinds of
expression, such as political communication.
Justice Stevens emphasized, however, that
truthful commercial speech could be highly
valuable to consumers and that courts should
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aggressively police laws that suppress it in the
name of promoting a government policy.
"Advertising has been a part of our culture
throughout our history," beginning in colonial
times, Justice Stevens wrote. He was joined in his
most far-reaching language by Justices Anthony
Kennedy, David Souter and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
Justice Stevens urged that the Supreme Court
abandon a 1986 Supreme Court case that had
upheld a ban on certain casino advertising in
Puerto Rico on the theory that the island's
government could have taken the broader step of
outlawing gambling altogether. Restricting
speech is more constitutionally dangerous than
restricting activity, he asserted. The fact that the
activity might be categorized as a "vice,"
shouldn't give government any more leeway to
stop communication about it, he added. Three
other justices joined this portion of the Stevens
opinion. Justice O'Connor wasn't one of them,
but in her separate opinion, she also suggested
that the 1986 decision isn't good law anymore.
Three other justices joined the generally more
cautious O'Connor opinion.
The Rhode Island case began in 1991 when
a liquor store owner in the state placed ads in a
newspaper that referred indirectly to prices,
provoking complaints from competitors that it
had violated the ban. For example, the ad
included the word 'WOW" in large letters next to
pictures of vodka and rum bottles. After paying
a $400 fine, the store operator, joined by another
retailer, sued the state in federal court.
The plaintiffs won at trial, but lost before the
federal appeals court in Boston. The appeals
court based its decision partly on the 21st
Amendment, which ended Prohibition, but gave
states primary authority to regulate liquor. Justice
Stevens did get a majority to agree that the 21st
Amendment didn't free the states to ignore the
First Amendment (44 Liquormart Inc. vs. Rhode
Island)
Copyright 0 1996, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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SUPREME COURT DUMPS R.I.'S BAN ON LIQUOR PRICING ADS
The Baton Rouge Advocate
Tuesday, May 14, 1996
Richard Carelli, AP
WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court, in a
decision that might hamper President Clinton's
effort to limit cigarette advertising, Monday
struck down Rhode Island's ban on ads that list or
refer to liquor prices.
A unanimous court said the ban, aimed at
promoting sobriety, violates free-speech rights.
The ruling also gave other commercial speech
greater protection against government regulation.
The full impact of the ruling, spelled out in
four separate opinions, probably will not be
known until lower courts begin to interpret it.
But the ruling marked the high court's
strongest statement against regulating
commercial speech since a landmark 1975
decision that extended to advertising the First
Amendment's free-speech guarantee.
Monday's decision appeared to move
commercial speech a step closer to being as
protected against government regulation as
political or artistic expression. But while all nine
justices voted to enhance the freedom to
advertise, only four favored doing so in sweeping
fashion.
The court, however, appeared ready to
discredit its own 1986 decision that said
government may prohibit advertising for an
activity if that activity - such as gambling - could
be prohibited altogether.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote in Monday's
main opinion that blanket bans such as Rhode
Island's prohibition against liquor ads "rarely
survive constitutional review." He rejected the
state's argument that ads for "vice" products such
as liquor should be subjected to increased
regulation.
Just labeling some activity as a vice isn't
enough to justify clamping down on accurate
advertising if that activity itself remains legal,
Stevens said.
Clinton and the Food and Drug
Administration have proposed rules, opposed by
the tobacco industry and others, that would
forbid cigarette brand advertising at sports events
and on T-shirts and other goods.
The-- proposed rules would ban tobacco
billboards within 1,000 feet of schools and
playgrounds and limit the use of pictures and
colors in cigarette ads.
"I think the court's ruling gives more
ammunition to those who inevitably are going to
challenge any restrictions on cigarette
advertising," said Scott Bullock, an Institute of
Justice lawyer who had opposed the Rhode
Island ban.
"It's not a closed case but the ruling appears
to help their arguments," he said.
FDA spokesman Jim O'Hara said the
proposed rules do not amount to a blanket ban on
cigarette advertising but instead are aimed at
reducing tobacco products' appeal to minors, for
whom smoking is illegal.
White House spokesman Mike McCurry
added, "We are interested in advertising that is
aimed at minors, at young people ... The
president sees smoking by young people as a
health issue."
The advertising industry, which is challenging
FDA tobacco proposals, cheered the high court's
ruling.
"Big Brother took a hit between the eyes with
this decision," said Hal Shoup, executive vice
president of the American Association of
Advertising Agencies. "Clearly the Supreme
Court looks with disfavor upon government
attempts to regulate consumer behavior by
censoring advertising."
The national trade association said it expects
the decision will bolster its challenge to the FDA
on tobacco. It also said it believes the case will
affect a dispute over liquor ads in Baltimore.
Daniel W. Donahue, an R J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. attorney, also applauded the ruling,
calling it "a heartening endorsement of
constitutional principles and a firm blow to
78
back-door prohibitionists who seek to socially
engineer adult behavior."
While the Rhode Island case was under
study, the justices held off considering a dispute
over Baltimore's limits on billboard ads for
alcoholic beverages. The city ordinance is aimed
at curbing underage drinking.
Rhode Island law allows advertising for
alcoholic beverages but since 1956 had required
publishers and- broadcasters to exclude any
mention of prices, or even the word "sale."
The price-advertising ban was challenged by
a Johnston, RI., liquor store, 44 Liquormart Inc.,
and by Peoples Super Liquor Stores, which sells
liquor to Rhode Island residents from two
Massachusetts stores.
The justices had been told many states have
laws that ban or in some way limit liquor-price
advertising. Listed as examples were Arkansas,
Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania and South Carolina.
In a key part of Monday's ruling, Stevens
wrote:
"When a state entirely prohibits the
dissemination of truthful, non-misleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated
to the preservation of a fair bargaining
process, there is far less reason to depart
from the rigorous review that the First
Amendment generally demands."
He was joined in that part of his opinion by
Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Clarence Thomas.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in a
concurring opinion for herself, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices David H.
Souter and Stephen G. Breyer, also agreed that
the Rhode Island law must fall. But they favored
a more narrowly focused ruling.
Justice Antonin Scalia voted to strike down
the law for yet other reasons.
Thomas would have gone farther in
protecting commercial speech than any other
member of the court. "All attempts to dissuade
legal choices by citizens by keeping them
ignorant are impermissible," he wrote.
Copyright 1996, The Associated Press
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COURT BACKS ADVERTISERS' FREE SPEECH
USA Today
Tuesday, May 14, 1996
Tony Mauro
The Supreme Court struck down a law restricting liquor advertising
Monday in a ruling that could affect proposed regulation of cigarette ads.
-The ruling -strengthens -the hand of -those who -oppose the- tobacco
restrictions," says advertising law expert Cameron DeVore of Seattle.
Daniel Donahue, an R.J. Reynolds Tobacco lawyer, called the ruling "a firm
blow to back-door prohibitionists who seek to socially engineer adult behavior."
The Rhode Island law, similar to those in 11 other states, banned any
mention of price or "sale" in liquor ads. The state said the law was aimed at
reducing liquor consumption.
The court was unanimous in the view that the state had not met its "heavy
burden" ofjustifying laws that restrict the free-speech rights of advertisers.
Though the justices splintered over their reasons, the ruling was seen as the
court's strongest endorsement of First Amendment protection for commercial
speech or ads.
"All attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant
are impermissible," wrote Justice Clarence Thomas.
The ruling effectively overturned a 10-year-old decision that allowed
restrictions on casino gambling ads. That ruling has provided ammunition for
arguments in favor of restrictions on tobacco advertising.
President Clinton and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have
proposed rules to tone down tobacco ads, restrict billboards near schools and
bar brand ads at sports events.
The tobacco and advertising industries immediately challenged the
regulations in court.
Advocates of restricting cigarette ads say firms have other ways to spread
their message.
"The FDA rules should be OK," says John Banzhaf of Action on Smoking
and Health.
USA Today Copyright 1996
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HIGH COURT CALLS MOST AD BANS UNLAWFUL
Ruling Could Threaten Baltimore's Attempts to Curb Billboards
The Baltimore Sun
Tuesday, May 14, 1996
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON - In a broad ruling that could
liberate advertisers from many government controls,
the Supreme Court ruled yesterday that the
Constitution allows officials only narrow authority
to decide what consumers may be told.
Many controls on ads, the court said, "rest
solely on the offensive assumption that the public"
will misuse truthful information in ads.
The First Amendment, Justice John Paul
Stevens wrote, "directs us to be especially skeptical
of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark
for what the government perceives to be their own
good."
Advertising, he added, "has been a part of our
culture throughout our history," noting that even
Benjamin Franklin defended the free press to
support his printing of ads to promote voyages to
Barbados.
The decision, one of the most sweeping in the
two decades since the court began providing First
Amendment protection for "commercial speech,"
raised doubts about two Baltimore city ordinances
restricting billboards that promote liquor and
cigarettes.
It also could force the Clinton administration to
act with particular caution as the Food and Drug
Administration shapes proposed rules to restrict
advertising and other promotion of cigarettes when
the messages are aimed at children.
Already, the FDA's claim of authority to impose
those rules is under challenge in a federal court in
North Carolina, and yesterday's ruling could become
critical to that case.
The exact scope of the justices' ruling, however,
is likely to require years of test cases in lower
courts, especially because the justices split into
several different voting coalitions in deciding
unanimously to strike down two Rhode Island laws
banning liquor price advertising.
Moreover, the section of the Stevens opinion
that used the strongest words to condemn
government controls on ads had the support of only
three other justices.
One of those four, Justice Clarence Thomas,
wanted to go even further, to nullify virtually all
controls on truthful ads -- a position only he
supported. "All attempts to dissuade legal choices
by citizens by keeping them ignorant are
impermissible," he wrote.
The justices' next chance to show how far they
intend the ruling to go could come swiftly, in two
Baltimore cases awaiting the court's attention. As
early as next Monday, the court may act on appeals
to test the constitutionality of the city's two 1994
ordinances restricting billboards and other signs that
advertise liquor and cigarettes. The city's curbs are
designed to reduce children's exposure to liquor and
cigarette promotions.
Both those laws were upheld by a federal
appeals court in Richmond, Va., in August.
Challengers took the cases on to the Supreme Court,
where they have been on hold until the court ruled
on the Rhode Island liquor ads case.
Those cases might simply be sent back to the
appeals court for another look; that would be one of
the first chances for federal courts to apply
yesterday's ruling. The Richmond court also will
handle the tobacco industry's challenge to the
Clinton administration's anti-smoking campaign.
Yesterday, a city attorney for Baltimore and the
Food and Drug Administration's spokesman said
separately that the new decision would not scuttle
city or FDA efforts to restrict advertising.
Baltimore's senior city solicitor, Burton H.
Levin, said officials "believe the court of appeals
will again uphold Baltimore's laws." None of the
reasoning behind the appeals court's ruling in favor
of those laws was "discredited" yesterday, he said.
The ordinances do not impose a flat ban on
liquor or cigarette ads, as the Rhode Island price
advertising law did, Mr. Levin said. The Baltimore
ordinances, he added, restrict such ads only in
certain areas, where children most likely would be
unaccompanied by adults.
James A. O'Hara III, a spokesman for the FDA,
also noted that the restrictions on cigarette ads under
study by that agency are narrower than those the
justices struck down yesterday. Those proposals, he
81
said, "will allow tobacco companies to give their
adult consumers all the information they need."
O'Hara said that the FDA is mindful of the need
to obey constitutional protection for commercial
speech. He said the agency had no timetable for
issuing its rules in final form.
Both the city and the FDA could find some
basis for optimism in the fact that Stevens' opinion,
the main one, spoke of protecting only ads that
promote "lawful" activity.--Ads that --targeted-
children, by contrast, might be promoting unlawful
activity, because it is illegal across the nation for
children to buy cigarettes and liquor.
The two Rhode Island laws nullified yesterday,
both dating to 1956, were aimed at liquor prices.
One banned all off-premises advertising of liquor,
beer and wine prices; the other banned the news
media from running ads that include liquor, beer or
wine prices. The bans were so strict that they were
even applied to promotional words like "sale" or
"WOW!" in ads.
The court flatly rejected an argument by Rhode
Island that, since the Constitution's 21st
Amendment allows states to control liquor sales, the
First Amendment does not provide the same
protection for even truthful commercial information
about liquor.
It also ruled that Rhode Island's bans, adopted
-to try to reduce consumption of alcoholic beverages,
did not serve that goal.
Stevens' main opinion made clear that the ads
gaining protection from the new ruling would be
those that include truthful information. The
decision, he stressed, did not erase government's
power to regulate ads that are deceptive, or cause
"commercial harms" -- a phrase he did not define.
Copyright 1996 The Baltimore Sun Company
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44 LIQUORMART, INC. and Peoples Super Liquor Stores, Inc., Petitioners,
V.
State of RHODE ISLAND and RHODE ISLAND Liquor Stores Association
116 S. Ct. 1495
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Nov. 1, 1995.
Decided May 13, 1996.
Justice STEVENS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts III, VII, and VIII, an opinion with respect to Parts III and V, in which Justice KENNEDY,
Justice SOUTER, and Justice GINSBURG join, an opinion with respect to Part VI, in which Justice
KENNEDY, Justice THOMAS, and Justice GINSBURG join, and an opinion with respect to Part IV, in
which Justice KENNEDY and Justice GINSBURG join.
Last Term we held that a federal law abridging a brewer's right to provide the public with accurate
information about the alcoholic content of malt beverages is unconstitutional. We now hold that Rhode
Island's statutory prohibition against advertisements that provide the public with accurate information about
retail prices of alcoholic beverages is also invalid. Our holding rests on the conclusion that such an
advertising ban is an abridgment of speech protected by the First Amendment and that it is not shielded from
constitutional scrutiny by the Twenty-first Amendment.
I
In 1956, the Rhode Island Legislature enacted two separate prohibitions against advertising the retail
price of alcoholic beverages. The first applies to vendors licensed in Rhode Island as well as to out-of-state
manufacturers, wholesalers, and shippers. It prohibits them from "advertising in any manner whatsoever"
the price of any alcoholic beverage offered for sale in the State; the only exception is for price tags or signs
displayed with the merchandise within licensed premises and not visible from the street. The second statute
applies to the Rhode Island news media. It contains a categorical prohibition against the publication or
broadcast of any advertisements--even those referring to sales in other States--that "make reference to the
price of any alcoholic beverages.".
In two cases decided in 1985, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of these
two statutes. It concluded that the statute served the substantial state interest in " 'the promotion of
temperance.' " Although that presumption had not been overcome in that case, the State Supreme Court
assumed that in a future case the record might "support the proposition that these advertising restrictions do
not further temperance objectives".....
II
Petitioners 44 Liquormart, Inc. (44 Liquormart), and Peoples Super Liquor Stores, Inc. (Peoples), are
licensed retailers of alcoholic beverages. Petitioner 44 Liquormart operates a store in Rhode Island and
petitioner Peoples operates several stores in Massachusetts that are patronized by Rhode Island residents.
Peoples uses alcohol price advertising extensively in Massachusetts, where such advertising is permitted, but
Rhode Island newspapers and other media outlets have refused to accept such ads.
Complaints from competitors about an advertisement placed by 44 Liquormart in a Rhode Island
newspaper in 1991 generated enforcement proceedings that in turn led to the initiation of this litigation. The
advertisement did not state the price of any alcoholic beverages. Indeed, it noted that "State law prohibits
advertising liquor prices." The ad did, however, state the low prices at which peanuts, potato chips, and
Schweppes mixers were being offered, identify various brands of packaged liquor, and include the word
"WOW" in large letters next to pictures of vodka and rum bottles. Based on the conclusion that the implied
reference to bargain prices for liquor violated the statutory ban on price advertising, the Rhode Island Liquor
Control Administrator assessed a $400 fine.
After paying the fine, 44 Liquormart, joined by Peoples, filed this action. The parties stipulated that the
price advertising ban is vigorously enforced, that Rhode Island permits "all advertising of alcoholic beverages
excepting references to price outside the licensed premises," and that petitioners' proposed ads do not concern
an illegal activity and presumably would not be false or misleading. The parties disagreed, however, about
the impact of the ban on the promotion of temperance in Rhode Island. On that question the District Court
heard conflicting expert testimony and reviewed a number of studies. . . .
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After summarizing the testimony of the expert witnesses for both parties, he found "as a fact that Rhode
Island's off-premises liquor price advertising ban has no significant impact on levels of alcohol consumption
in Rhode Island."
As a matter of law, he concluded that the price advertising ban was unconstitutional because it did not
"directly advance" the State's interest in reducing alcohol consumption and was "more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest." He reasoned that the party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial
speech carries the burden ofjustfying it and that the Twenty-first Amendment did not shift or diminish that
burden. Acknowledging that it might have been reasonable for the state legislature to "assume a correlation
between the price advertising ban and reduced consumption," he held that more than a rational basis was
required to justify the speech restriction, and that the State had failed to demonstrate a reasonable " 'fit'"
between its policy objectives and its-chosen means.
The Court of Appeals reversed. It found "inherent merit" in the State's submission that competitive price
advertising would lower prices and that lower prices would produce more sales. Moreover, it agreed with
the reasoning of the Rhode Island Supreme Court that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the statutes an
added presumption of validity....
E
Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history. Even in colonial days, the public relied
on "commercial speech" for vital information about the market.
In accord with the role that commercial messages have long played, the law has developed to ensure that
advertising provides consumers with accurate information about the availability of goods and services.
In Bigelow v. Virginia we held that it was error to assume that commercial speech was entitled to no First
Amendment protection or that it was without value in the marketplace of ideas. The following Term in
Virginia Bd. ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. we expanded on our holding in
Bigelow and held that the State's blanket ban on advertising the price of prescription drugs violated the First
Amendment. We explained: "Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason,
and at what price."
The opinion further explained that a State's paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful,
nonmisleading commercial information unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it....
On the basis of these principles, our early cases uniformly struck down several broadly based bans on
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech, each of which served ends unrelated to consumer protection. [In
a footnote the Court noted the development of a balancing test:
"In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must
determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether
it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."]
mhe Court concluded that "special care" should attend the review of such blanket bans, and it pointedly
remarked that "in recent years this Court has not approved a blanket ban on commercial speech unless the
speech itself was flawed in some way, either because it was deceptive or related to unlawful activity."
IV
[W]hen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for
reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the
rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands.
Most obviously, complete speech bans, unlike content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, or manner
of expression are particularly dangerous because they all but foreclose alternative means of disseminating
certain information.
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech rarely seek to protect
consumers from either deception or overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that
the public will respond "irrationally" to the truth. The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical
of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.
That teaching applies equally to state attempts to deprive consumers of accurate information about their
chosen products.
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V
In this case, there is no question that Rhode Island's price advertising ban constitutes a blanket
prohibition against truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful product. There is also no question that the
ban serves an end unrelated to consumer protection. Accordingly, we must review the price advertising ban
with "special care," mindful that speech prohibitions of this type rarely survive constitutional review.
The State argues that the price advertising prohibition should nevertheless be upheld because it directly
advances the State's substantial interest in promoting temperance, and because it is no more extensive than
necessary.
We can agree that common sense supports the conclusion that a prohibition against price advertising,
like a collusive agreement among competitors to refrain from such advertising, will tend to mitigate
competition and maintain prices at a higher level than would prevail in a completely free market.
Although the record suggests that the price advertising ban may have some impact on the purchasing
patterns of temperate drinkers of modest means, the State has presented no evidence to suggest that its speech
prohibition will significantly reduce market-wide consumption. Indeed, the District Court's considered and
uncontradicted finding on this point is directly to the contrary.
Thus, the State's own showing reveals that any connection between the ban and a significant change in
alcohol consumption would be purely fortuitous.
The State also cannot satisfy the requirement that its restriction on speech be no more extensive than
necessary. As the State's own expert conceded, higher prices can be maintained either by direct regulation
or by increased taxation. Per capita purchases could be limited as is the case with prescription drugs. Even
educational campaigns focused on the problems of excessive, or even moderate, drinking might prove to be
more effective.
As a result, even under the less than strict standard that generally applies in commercial speech cases,
the State has failed to establish a "reasonable fit" between its abridgment of speech and its temperance goal.
VI
Finally, we find unpersuasive the State's contention that the price advertising ban should be upheld
because it targets commercial speech that pertains to a "vice" activity. [T]he scope of any "vice" exception
to the protection afforded by the First Amendment would be difficult, if not impossible, to define. Almost
any product that poses some threat to public health or public morals might reasonably be characterized by
a state legislature as relating to "vice activity". Such characterization, however, is anomalous when applied
to products such as alcoholic beverages, lottery tickets, or playing cards, that may be lawfully purchased on
the open market. The recognition of such an exception would also have the unfortunate consequence of either
allowing state legislatures tojustify censorship by the simple expedient of placing the "vice" label on selected
lawful activities, or requiring the federal courts to establish a federal common law of vice. For these reasons,
a "vice" label that is unaccompanied by a corresponding prohibition against the commercial behavior at issue
fails to provide a principled justification for the regulation of commercial speech about that activity.
VII
Section 2 [of the Twenty-first Amendment] delegated to the several States the power to prohibit
commerce in, or the use of alcoholic beverages. The States' regulatory power over this segment of commerce
is therefore largely "unfettered by the Commerce Clause."
As is clear, the text of the Twenty-first Amendment supports the view that, while it grants the States
authority over commerce that might otherwise be reserved to the Federal Government, it places no limit
whatsoever on other constitutional provisions. Nevertheless, Rhode Island argues, and the Court of Appeals
agreed, that in this case the Twenty-first Amendment tilts the First Amendment analysis in the State's favor.
As we explained in a [1984] case, although the Twenty-first Amendment limits the effect of the dormant
Commerce Clause on a State's regulatory power over the delivery or use of intoxicating beverages within its
borders, "the Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the
Constitution." That general conclusion reflects our specific holdings that the Twenty-first Amendment does
not in any way diminish the force of the Supremacy Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Equal Protection
Clause. We see no reason why the First Amendment should not also be included in that list. Accordingly,
we now hold that the Twenty-first Amendment does not qualify the constitutional prohibition against laws
abridging the freedom of speech embodied in the First Amendment The Twenty-first Amendment, therefore,
cannot save Rhode Island's ban on liquor price advertising.
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VIII
Because Rhode Island has failed to carry its heavy burden of justifying its complete ban on price
advertising, we conclude that R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 3-8-7 and 3-8-8.1, as well as Regulation 32 of the Rhode
Island Liquor Control Administration, abridge speech in violation of the First Amendment as made
applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is therefore reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. [OMITTED]
Justice THOMAS, concurring in Parts 1, 11, VI, and VII, and.concurring in the judgment.
In cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or
service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balancing test adopted in Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n ofN. Y. should not be applied, in my view. Rather, such
an "interest" is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of "commercial" speech than it can
justify regulation of "noncommercial" speech.
I
In case after case following Virginia Pharmacy Bd., the Court, and individual members of the Court,
have continued to stress the importance of free dissemination of information about commercial choices in
a market economy; the antipaternalistic premises of the First Amendment; the impropriety of manipulating
consumer choices or public opinion through the suppression of accurate "commercial" information; the near
impossibility of severing "commercial" speech from speech necessary to democratic decisionmaking; and the
dangers of permitting the government to do covertly what it might not have been able to muster the political
support to do openly.
In other decisions, however, the Court has appeared to accept the legitimacy of laws that suppress
information in order to manipulate the choices of consumers--so long as the government could show that the
manipulation was in fact successful....
I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that "commercial" speech is of "lower value"
than "noncommercial" speech. Indeed, some historical materials suggest to the contrary. Nor do I believe
that the only explanations that the Court has ever advanced for treating "commercial" speech differently from
other speech can justify restricting "commercial" speech in order to keep information from legal purchasers
so as to thwart what would otherwise be their choices in the marketplace....
II
I do not join the principal opinion's application of the Central Hudson balancing test because I do not
believe that such a test should be applied to a restriction of "commercial" speech, at least when, as here, the
asserted interest is one that is to be achieved through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark.
Application of the advancement-of- state-interest prong of Central Hudson makes little sense to me in such
circumstances. Faulting the State for failing to show that its price advertising ban decreases alcohol
consumption "significantly," as Justice STEVENS does seems to imply that if the State had been more
successful at keeping consumers ignorant and thereby decreasing their consumption, then the restriction
might have been upheld. This contradicts Virginia Pharmacy Bd.'s rationale for protecting "commercial"
speech in the first instance....
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE BREYER
join, concurring in the judgment
Rhode Island offers one, and only one, justification for its ban on price advertising. Rhode Island says
that the ban is intended to keep alcohol prices high as a way to keep consumption low. By preventing sellers
from informing customers of prices, the regulation prevents competition from driving prices down and
requires consumers to spend more time to find the best price for alcohol. The higher cost of obtaining
alcohol, Rhode Island argues, will lead to reduced consumption.
The fit between Rhode Island's method and this particular goal is not reasonable. If the target is simply
higher prices generally to discourage consumption, the regulation imposes too great, and unnecessary, a
prohibition on speech in order to achieve it. The State has other methods at its disposal-methods that would
more directly accomplish this stated goal without intruding on sellers' ability to provide truthful,
nonmisleading information to customers. Indeed, Rhode Island's own expert conceded that " 'the objective
of lowering consumption of alcohol by banning price advertising could be accomplished by establishing
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minimum prices and/or by increasing sales taxes on alcoholic beverages." The ready availability of such
alternatives-at least some of which would far more effectively achieve Rhode Island's only professed goal,
at comparatively small additional administrative cost-demonstrates that the fit between ends and means is
not narrowly tailored. . . .
The Twenty-first Amendment does not trump First Amendment rights or add a presumption of validity
to a regulation that cannot otherwise satisfy First Amendment requirements.
Rhode Island's prohibition on alcohol-price advertising, as a means to keep alcohol prices high and
consumption low, cannot survive First Amendment scrutiny. The Twenty-first Amendment cannot save this
otherwise invalid regulation. While I agree with the Court's finding that the regulation is invalid, I would
decide that issue on narrower grounds. I therefore concur in the judgment.
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95-992 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM
INC. v. FCC
Cable television-"Must carry" provisions-First
Amendment.
Ruling below (DC DC, 12/12/95):
"Must carry" provisions of 1992 Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Protection and Competition Act,
which require cable television systems to devote
portion of their channels to transmission of local
commercial and public broadcast television sta-
tions, are narrowly tailored, content-neutral re-
strictions on speech and thus satisfy intermediate
level of First Amendment scrutiny to which U.S.
Supreme Court has said such provisions are
.subject.
Question presented: In absence of any jeopardy
to health of overall system of free, local broadcast
television (nationally or in particular markets),
does First Amendment permit Congress to im-
pose on all cable operators requirement of man-
datory carriage of local broadcast stations in
preference to all other programmers?
Appeal filed 12/21/95, by H. Bartow Farr III,
Richard G. Taranto, Farr & Taranto, Bruce D.
Sokler, Christopher A. Holt, J. Stephen
Zielezienski, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky
and Popeo P.C., James H. Johnston, Brian Con-
boy, Theodore Case Whitehouse, Willkie Farr &
Gaflagher, Albert G. Lauber Jr., Peter Van N.
Lockwood, and Caplin & Dr)sdale, all of Wash-
ington, D.C., and Robert D. Joffe, Stuart W.
Gold, Rowan D. Wilson, Justin J. Daniels, and
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, all of New York,
N.Y.
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JUSTICES RECONSIDER LAW REQUIRING CABLE TV
TO CARRY LOCAL STATIONS' SIGNALS
The New York Times
February 21, 1996
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON: In a case with important First
Amendment -implications .for - Government
regulation of communications, the Supreme Court
agreed today to review a 1992 Federal law that
requires cable television systems to retransmit the
signals of local broadcast television stations.
The cable industry has fought the requirement
as an unconstitutional interference with editorial
discretion, a form of compelled speech that under
Supreme Court precedent would clearly violate the
First Amendment if applied to require a newspaper
to carry material that its editors did not want to
print.
Broadcasters sought and have defended the
"must carry" rule, as the requirement is known, as
necessary for the survival of at least some stations
that would otherwise be dropped by cable systems
and thus be cut off from the nearly two-thirds of
American households that now do their
television-watching by means of a cable connection.
The case is before the Supreme Court for the
second time. In June 1994, a bare majority endorsed
the general economic theory behind the law, the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act: that the role of cable as a
"bottleneck or gatekeeper," as Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy described it in his opinion for the Court,
creates a potential for abuse that could result in
fewer choices being available to television viewers.
But rather than uphold the law at that time, the
5-to-4 majority voted instead to send the case back
for further review before a special panel of three
Federal judges. The special court, authorized by
Congress to provide a speedy constitutional review
of a law with evident constitutional vulnerabilities,
had initially upheld the must-carry provision in
1993 and upheld it again two months ago. The cable
industry then brought the new Supreme Court
appeal.
The case, which will not be argued until next
fall, reaches the Court at a time of change and
ferment in communications law, with First
Amendment issues at the forefront. On Wednesday,
the Justices will hear arguments in a constitutional
challenge to a separate Federal law, intended to curb
access to sexually explicit programming on certain
cable channels. And the new Telecommunications
Act of 1996, an overhaul of current law that
President Clinton signed earlier this month, is
already under attack in Federal court for provisions
regulating indecency.
While these cases raise distinct issues, they have
in common the need for the Court to settle on an
appropriate standard of review for the constitutional
issues presented. In its earlier ruling on the
must-carry provision, the Court selected an
intermediate standard of review for regulation of
cable television: more searching scrutiny than would
be applied to broadcast television, but well short of
the strict scrutiny that bars most Government
regulation of the print media.
Now the Court must give some content to the
general prescriptions of the 1994 ruling by deciding
whether the economic evidence the lower court
considered about the effect of cable on the health of
broadcast television was weighty enough to meet the
standard of review.
The lower court concluded that in the absence of
the must-carry provision, substantial numbers of
broadcast stations would lose the cable audience and
would decline or fail as a result. In its appeal,
Turner Broadcasting v. Federal Communications
Commission, No. 95-992, the cable industry is
arguing that this concern amounts to protectionism
and reflects an impermissible judicial endorsement
of the proposition that "more broadcast stations is
always a good thing."
The makeup of the Court has changed in a
potentially significant way since its initial
consideration of the must-carry provision. Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, a member of the 5-to-4
majority in 1994, has retired, and his successor,
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who tends to analyze
Government regulation from an economic
perspective, may well take a more skeptical view of
the desirability and efficacy of the regulation in this
case.
The very fact that the Court decided on a
second, full-dress review of the case suggests that
the Justices were not satisfied with their 1994 ruling
as the last word. Under the special appellate review
provisions Congress attached to the law, the Court
could have decided the case summarily, upholding
the lower court in a brief order without a full
opinion. The Clinton Administration, joined by the
broadcast industry, urged the Justices to take that
course.
Copyright 1996 The New York Times Company
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JUSTICES TO RULE ON FEDERAL MANDATE FOR CABLE TV
TO CARRY LOCAL STATIONS
The Star-Ledger Newark, NJ
Wednesday, February 21, 1996
Aaron Epstein, KRT News Service
WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court agreed
yesterday to decide whether cable television systems
may be required to carry local broadcast stations
into the homes of millions of Americans.
In a case of major importance to the cable TV
industry, local broadcasters and their viewers, the
high court will decide whether the "must-carry" rule
violates the free-speech rights of cable operators. A
decision is expected during the 1996-97 court term
beginning in October.
The must-carry rule, enacted by Congress in
1992 to promote diverse broadcasting and fair
competition, requires cable operators to devote up to
one-third of their channels to local private and
public stations.
The 1996 telecommunications law extends the
provision to telephone companies that enter the
cable TV business.
Without the rule, the government says, cable
systems would favor the most profitable
programming at the expense of small local stations,
causing those stations to wither or die.
Public TV broadcasters, which support the
government, say Congress approved the rule after
hearing evidence that cable operators had dropped,
refused to carry or changed channel positions of
public television stations.
But cable operators, led by the Turner
Broadcasting System, argue that the rule
unconstitutionally favors local stations while
discriminating against independent programmers.
The operators say there is no need for the rule
because local operators voluntarily carry most local
stations. The stations at risk of being dropped, they
say, are the ones that are "little watched in their
local communities."
Cable systems now control 64 percent of all
American television households, a figure expected
to climb above 70 percent by the end of this decade.
The case of Turner Broadcasting vs. Federal
Communications Commission is before the high
court for the second time.
In 1994, the cable operators sought the same
high level of constitutional protection ordinarily
given to newspapers to shield them from
government censorship. In response, the FCC
argued that the cable industry deserves no greater
protection than commercial broadcasting, which is
regulated.
- By- a 5-4-vote, the Supreme Court chose an
intermediate legal standard. Under that test, the
must-carry rule would be upheld if it (1) furthers an
important governmental goal, and (2) doesn't restrict
freedom of speech any more than necessary to
achieve that goal.
The case was sent back to a federal District
Court in Washington, D.C., which ruled 2-1 last
year that the must-carry provision was reasonably
necessary to protect the economic health of local
broadcasting.
Because the vast majority of communities with
cable television are served by only one cable
operator, the operator has "monopoly power" and
"gatekeeper control" over most, if not all,
programming, U.S. District Judge Stanley Sporkin
explained for the lower court.
Without the must-carry rule, he said, cable
operators would drop local stations in an effort to
increase their advertising revenues and favor their
own programming.
He cited statistics showing that cable operators
have been able to satisfy their obligations 87 percent
of the time by giving local broadcasters access to
unused channels.
But the dissenting judge, Stephen Williams,
said the government was still unable to show that
any local station, commercial or public, had gone
out of business when there was no must-carry rule
from 1985 to 1992.
The stations helped by the rule accounted for
only a "diminutive share of total television viewing,"
Williams said.
Moreover, he noted, there is a less restrictive
alternative to the rule: an A/B switch that enables a
viewer to flip between cable and any over-the-air
channels not carried on cable.
Viewers who don't have the switch on their
remote controls consider it inconvenient to get up
from their armchairs or couches to use it, according
to a 1993 survey.
Williams observed: "Government-mandated
carriage (of local stations) seems a rather
astonishing solution to a problem (of the)
consumers' occasional need to 'get up."'
Copyright 1996 Knight-Ridder News Service
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95-1065 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NET-
WORK OF WESTERN NEW YORK
Abortion-Limits on protests at abortion clinic-
First Amendment.
Ruling below (CA 2, 64 LW 2198):
Injunction imposing "floating" 15-foot buffer
zone between anti-abortion protesters and abor-
tion clinic entrances or persons entering or leav-
- ing clinic, -but allowing two protesters to engage
in non-threatening counseling within zone unless
patient expresses desire to be left alone, is con-
tent-neutral and burdens no more speech than
necessary to protect significant government inter-
ests in medical safety, public safety, and access to
abortions, and thus does not violate First
Amendment.
Questions presented: (I) Is en banc decision of
Second Circuit upholding provision of injunction
that prohibits all speech within overlapping 15-
foot floating no-speech zones (which create 15-
foot no-speech bubble around abortion clinic)
most precise way to ensure access to clinic and
promote public health and safety in context of
overwhelmingly peaceful demonstrations and lack
of any finding that less restrictive injunction
could not accomplish same goal? (2) Does Sec-
ond Circuit's decision upholding "cease and de-
sist" provision in injunction below, based on dis-
like by communicatee of words being spoken by
communicator, conflict with Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, 62 LW 4686 (US SupCt 1994),
which held that no-approach zone burdened more
speech than necessary and further rejected con-
tent based restrictions on speech as violation of
First Amendment?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/27/95, by
Thomas Patrick Monaghan, Keith A. Fornier,
and American Center for Law and Justice, all of
New Hope, Ky., John F. Sweeney, Gabriel P.
Kralik, and Morgan & Finnegan, all of New
York, N.Y., and Vincent P. McCarthy, Joseph P.
Secola, and McCarthy & Secola, all of New
Milford, Conn.
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HIGH COURT TO REVISIT ISSUE OF CURBING
ABORTION-CLINIC PROTESTS
The New York Times
March 19, 1996
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON: With a Supreme Court ruling two
years ago having failed to settle the debate over
permissible limits on demonstrations at abortion
clinics, the Justices agreed today to examine the
issue again in a new case from upstate New York.
The question for the Court this time is whether
protesters have a free-speech right, protected by the
First Amendment, to approach abortion patients as
they make their way toward a clinic entrance and to
offer unwanted "sidewalk counseling" aimed at
dissuading the women from having abortions.
The Federal appeals court in New York, by a
13-to-2 vote last September, upheld a lower court's
imposition of a buffer zone around abortion clinics
in the Rochester and Buffalo areas. The buffer zone
not only keeps demonstrators 15 feet away from
clinic entrances but can also be invoked to cover
"any person or vehicle" entering or leaving the
property.
While two "sidewalk counselors" are permitted
to enter the 15-foot zone at any one time, the lower
court's order says they must "cease and desist" and
leave the protected area as soon as a person "who is
sought to be counseled wants to not have
counseling."
Judge Richard J. Arcara of Federal District
Court in Buffalo issued the injunction in 1992 after
finding that members of an anti-abortion group
called Project Rescue were routinely "harassing,
badgering, intimidating and yelling at" patients
entering abortion clinics in the area.
A three-judge panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Manhattan,
splitting 2 to 1, found the buffer zone to be
unconstitutionally restrictive in a decision issued in
September 1994, three months after the Supreme
Court had addressed related issues in an
abortion-protest case from Florida. The full Second
Circuit then re-examined the case and reached the
opposite result, with the two judges on the original
panel's majority, Thomas J. Meskill and Frank X.
Altimari, then cast in the role of dissenters.
The Supreme Court decision, in June 1994 in a
case called Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
upheld a 36-foot buffer zone around an abortion
clinic in Melbourne, Fla. A state-court injunction
prevented demonstrators from "congregating,
picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering" the
zone. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing
for the 6-to-3 majority that upheld the buffer zone,
found that it "burdens no more speech than
necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at
stake": ensuring public safety and protecting
unimpeded access to the clinic by patients and staff.
But at the same time, the Court struck down a
broader, 300-foot "no-approach" zone in which
anti-abortion demonstrators were prohibited from
approaching anyone who had not indicated "a desire
to communicate." That prohibition was too broad,
Chief Justice Rehnquist said.
In the majority opinion upholding the New York
injunction, Judge James L. Oakes said the 15-foot
buffer zone was justifiable because it was "far more
solicitous of the demonstrators' interest" than the
zone the Supreme Court had struck down in the
Florida case. That was because the New York
injunction permits demonstrators to approach
patients, even without an invitation, and deliver their
anti-abortion message until the patients walk away
or tell them to stop.
Judge Oakes wrote a low-key opinion with the
evident goal of fitting the New York injunction into
the structure the Supreme Court had outlined in the
Florida case. A concurring opinion by Judge Ralph
K. Winter applied a much more provocative First
Amendment analysis, however, so it might have
been this opinion that persuaded the Justices to
review the case.
Judge Winter said that under the First
Amendment, there was no need to "tolerate coercive
or obstructionist conduct solely because it serves
some passionate ideology or interest." He added:
"The First Amendment protects peaceful
communication, not self-indulgence. Nor need we
tolerate such conduct because it makes the advocate
feel good. The First Amendment is not a
governmental version of the psychiatrist's couch."
Oddly, Judge Winter's opinion, labeled a
concurring opinion, had the votes of 10 judges,
compared with nine signing the majority opinion by
Judge Oakes, raising the question of which was the
actual opinion of the appeals court. (With 15 judges
participating in the case, there was considerable
overlap among the supporters of each opinion).
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In appealing, lawyers for two anti-abortion
demonstrators emphasized the implications of the
appeals court's First Amendment analysis. They said
that in past rulings, like those upholding the right to
burn an American flag as a political statement, the
Supreme Court had not allowed the demonstrators'
First Amendment rights to be curtailed by the
distress caused to onlookers.
"It is difficult to conceive of speech on a
controversial issue that would not cause anxiety to
someone," the appeal said, adding, "Once accepted,
that rationale would leave the First Amendment in
tatters."
The appeal, Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,
No. 95-1065, was filed by the American Center for
Law and Justice, a law firm founded by Pat
Robertson, the television evangelist.
Perhaps the most interesting question about the
Court's action today is whether the Justices will
approach the case -- which will be argued next fall
-- as a case about abortion-clinic protests or about
the free-speech rights of protesters in general.
Last year, for example, the Court heard a case
on whether the organizers of the St. Patrick's Day
parade in Boston could exclude marchers who
wanted to identify themselves as gay and lesbian
Irish-Americans. While the case was widely viewed
as a gay-rights issue, the Court's unanimous opinion
upheld the First Amendment right of the organizers
not to be forced to carry an unwanted message, and
it dealt only tangentially with the fact that the
would-be marchers were homosexual.
The Court is unlikely to have taken the new case
to revisit issues it resolved in the 1994 Madsen
decision. While Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas and Anthony M. Kennedy were vigorous
dissenters in that case, arguing that the Florida
injunction was an unconstitutional effort to censor
the anti-abortion message, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
-majority opinion was equally firm in analyzing the
injunction as a neutral effort to protect public safety
that did not require the strict constitutional scrutiny
the Court reserves for Government actions that
curtail speech on the basis of its content.
It is probably evident to the Court, however,
that the 1994 decision left a number of questions
unanswered. For several months, the Justices have
been considering whether to hear an appeal from a
ruling of the California Supreme Court, which
applied the Madsen decision to uphold an injunction
that confines demonstrators to an area across a
four-lane street from an abortion clinic in Vallejo,
Calif The Justices will now presumably defer action
in that case, Williams v. Planned Parenthood, No.
95-576, until it decides the New York case next
year.
Copyright 1996 The New York Times Company
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PERSPECTIVE: ANTI-ABORTION PROTESTERS TREATED UNFAIRLY
St. Petersburg Times
Sunday, April 14, 1996
Robyn E. Blumner
They have been called "First Amendment
free" zones, "bubble" zones and "buffer" zones.
They are those areas around abortion clinics that
courts have put off-limits to anti-abortion
protesters. But whatever their name, the effect is
the same: censorship of one point of view at the
very place where it should be allowed to be
heard.
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear
another case on the constitutionality of these
no-anti-abortion speech zones. As opposed to the
last time the court decided the issue, allowing a
36-foot buffer zone around an abortion clinic to
stand, this time let's hope the court gets it right.
In 1994, the court, in Madsen vs. Women's
Health Center Inc., upheld an injunction against
a group of anti-abortion protesters and anyone
acting in concert with them. The injunction's
effect was to preclude anyone with anti-abortion
views from protesting within 36 feet of any
entrance at a Melbourne abortion clinic.
Sidewalks and other public property around an
abortion clinic, normally available for
demonstrations, were rendered off-limits to all
anti-abortion protesters because some had in the
past participated in clinic blockades.
The high court ruled that this limit on
picketing was constitutional, despite strong past
precedent that suggested otherwise. Civil rights
marchers, labor picketers and gay rights
activists, who have incited violent reactions and
engaged in disruptive conduct during their
pickets, have all had their right to peacefully
picket protected by courts. But this tent of First
Amendment protection that has sheltered
picketers in the past has been rudely yanked
down around anti-abortion protesters.
In a buffer zone case out of New York,
Schenck vs. Pro-Choice Network of Western NY,
which will be heard sometime next fall, the U.S.
Supreme Court can begin to make amends.
Schenck involves a group of anti-abortion
picketers who engaged in non-violent protests
outside a number of abortion clinics around
Buffalo, N.Y. The clinics got a restraining order
from a federal court against about 40
anti-abortion protesters, Project Rescue and
Operation Rescue. The order prohibited
protesters from trespassing on clinic property,
blockading entrances and touching or physically
impeding the movement of those entering the
clinic, all of which was already illegal conduct.
After the temporary restraining order was
issued, clinic picketing was generally conducted
on public streets and sidewalks with the use of
signs, chants, songs and prayers, in a wholly
peaceable manner. But when issuing the
permanent order the court expanded the list of
prohibited activities to include a roving
no-speech buffer zone. Protesters were ordered
to remain at least 15 feet away from all clinic
entrances as well as anyone entering or leaving
the clinic. In addition, the court allowed two
"sidewalk counselors" to breach the buffer zone
and offer any potential client their information,
but the counselors had to retreat behind the
15-foot line if the client indicated, either verbally
or non-verbally, that she was not interested.
The question the Supreme Court has agreed
to decide is whether this injunction, which
establishes the 15-foot buffer zone and the
mandatory retreat by the sidewalk counselors, is
constitutional.
Unlike legislation, injunctions constitute
censorship orders bereft of input by the general
public and elected representatives. Injunctions
are usually imposed by a single judge and
targeted at the speech of an individual or group,
which makes them potent tools for repression.
Nonetheless there are occasions when courts may
use this extraordinary power against expression
rights. But only in very limited circumstances.
In the Pentagon Papers case, the government
sought to stop the New York Times and
Washington Post from publishing a classified
study on policy making during the Vietnam War.
The government claimed that publication of the
study would compromise national security, yet
the Supreme Court found the claim to be an
insubstantial justification and rebuffed the
government.
Alternatively, courts have limited strikers'
picketing when there is evidence that a picket line
is so fraught with physical harassment and
violence that its very presence is a looming threat
of violent retribution to anyone who crosses it.
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However, when there is a combination of
intermittent threats and violence during an
otherwise peaceful campaign of picketing and
protest, the Supreme Court has ruled that the
occasional illegal act does not taint
constitutionally protected speech.
In 1966, the black citizens in Claiborne
County, Miss., organized a boycott of
white-owned businesses after their demands for
racial equality and justice were ignored. The
boycott consisted of occasional pickets outside
stores which refused to hire black employees, as
well as a group of "store watchers." Their job
was to write down the name of any black seen
patronizing the white businesses. The names of
boycott violators were read at NAACP meetings
and published in the Black Times.
Boycott leader Charles Evers, who was field
coordinator for the NAACP at the time, vowed
that boycott violators would be punished. "If we
catch any of you going in any of them racist
stores, we're gonna break your damn neck,"
Evers said. Those blacks who ignored the boycott
had shots fired into their homes and bricks
thrown through their car windows.
Mississippi's Supreme Court closed down the
boycott and picketing activities, but the U.S.
Supreme Court resurrected them. The court ruled
that the right to participate in concerted activity
does not lose its constitutional protection when
some members of the group engage in illegal
acts. Instead, only the unlawful behavior should
be punished and prevented, allowing the
peaceable activities to continue.
Fast forward to today. Rather than civil rights
marchers and labor protesters, we are confronted
with the speech and actions of anti-abortion
protesters - a despised minority, at least in liberal
circles. And suddenly the very high standard
courts had applied to injunctions that restrict
speech begins to drop. No longer, it seems, is
extensive evidence of past picket line violence
necessary before an injunction to prohibit
peaceful picketing is issued. No longer do
limitations on. speech. have to be surgically
designed and least restrictive.
The willingness of courts to shield targets of
anti-abortion picketers from uncomfortable
messages is of great concern. Fifteen feet may
not seem like very much, but 15 feet from anyone
walking on a sidewalk toward a clinic entrance
puts picketers smack in the middle of the road -
which means they must stand across the street.
There is not much impact to a message yelled
from that distance away. The effectiveness of a
communication, in the picketing context in
particular, is directly related to how close one is
to the intended receiver.
It is the obligation of our judges to dispense
justice impartially without regard to the ideology
of the those before them. The Supreme Court has
an opportunity to reject the anti-abortion
protester animus that has crept into our First
Amendment jurisprudence. That opportunity
should be seized.
(Robyn Blumner is a columnist, lawyer and
director of the Florida ACLU. The opinions she
expresses are not necessarily those of the ACLU.)
Reprinted with the permission of the author
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IIIGH COURT REVISITS ABORTION ISSUE
TO EYE LIMITS ON CLINIC PROTESTERS
The Washington Times
Tuesday, March 19, 1996
Frank J. Murray
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to clarify
the limits on abortion protests, 10 months after onejustice called anti-abortion forces too much of a
"disfavored class" to be heard on the issue.- -
Justices granted a hearing on an appeal from an
injunction forbidding protesters from speaking or
holding signs in a 15-foot "floating bubble" around
a clinic, patients or staff on public streets in Buffalo,
N.Y.
Ending the justices' boycott of cases involving
such protective "bubbles" means the first
abortion-related case heard in three terms will likely
be argued about Oct. 15 - injecting the issue into
the campaign debate three weeks before Election
Day.
"This gives us an opportunity to burst the
bubble," said a delighted Jay Sekulow, chief counsel
of the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ),
who will argue the protesters' case before the high
court.
"This floating zone unnecessarily burdens
speech. What could be a more drastic form of
censorship than stopping a message before it is
spoken?" Mr. Sekulow said.
The case taken by the court - the Rev. Paul
Schenck vs. Pro-Choice Network of Western New
York - was one of four challenges that ACLJ filed
this term to protest restrictions. Two were rejected,
and the other, Williams vs. Planned Parenthood,
was considered by the justices at six of their weekly
conferences without action.
"We should not have to stop talking because
someone doesn't want to listen to what we have to
say," said Mr. Schenck, now ACLJ executive vice
president.
He was convicted of violating the injunction and
fined $30,000, plus court costs of $100,000, which
are not at issue before the high court.
Asked what limits would be fair for protesters
as well as people wanting access to a clinic, he said,
"Certainly one that would restrict battery or
accosting or physical contact or an abusive volume
level, but not my right to speak."
The unusual accusation of bias against abortion
protesters was laid out publicly by Justice Antonin
Scalia in a memo on May 30, 1995, explaining why
he voted against taking a new case that would have
clarified the 1993 term's Madsen vs. Women's
Health Center case.
He called it vital to clarify Madsen, a 6-3
decision written by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist upholding a 36-foot buffer zone around
-a Florida. clinic but requiring injunctions not to
burden speech more than necessary.
"Clarification of Madsen is in any event
unlikely to occur in another case involving the
currently disfavored class of anti-abortion
protesters," he wrote.
"The temptation in cases involving issues of
social controversy - precisely the cases where the
First Amendment's protections are most needed -
will always be for judges to discern a policy against
whatever speech looks bad at the moment," Justice
Scalia wrote then.
After the court rejected several abortion-related
cases in October, Mr. Sekulow predicted "the
Supreme Court will ultimately hear this issue, and
were committed to making sure that happens."
Lucinda M. Finley, attorney for Pro-Choice
Network and a law professor at the State University
of New York, Buffalo, said in her brief that the
appeal is "a wholesale attack on the concept of
buffer zones."
"There is no First Amendment right to press
ideas on unwilling listeners," Ms. Finley's brief
argued, saying stress caused by threatening
confrontations can raise blood pressure and cause an
immunosuppressive response that may increase the
risk of infection.
In the Buffalo case, U.S. District Judge Richard
J. Arcara created the bubble zones and allowed two
"sidewalk counselors" to approach abortion clients
unless they expressed a wish to be left alone. A
three-judge panel of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the buffer zone and other
provisions were First Amendment speech violations
but a rehearing by the full appeals court reversed the
panel's ruling 13-2.
The Madsen rule has led to injunctions before
unlawful acts were committed and a willy-nilly span
of distance restrictions ranging from a few feet to
300 feet.
A challenge to the federal Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act on First Amendment grounds
was rejected in June. Keith A. Fournier, ACLJ
executive director, said the Schenck case is an
opportunity for the court to reassert that First
Amendment provisions "include even politically
incorrect speech."
The Washington Times Copyright 1996
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HIGH COURT WILL WEIGH CLINIC NO-SPEECH ZONES
"Right Not to Be Hassled" Is at Issue
Houston Chronicle
Tuesday, March 19, 1996
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder Tribune News
WASHINGTON - Returning to the national
debate over militant abortion protests, the Supreme
Court agreed Monday to decide whether courts may
create a floating no-speech zone to shield unwilling
listeners from demonstrators.
The justices will review a 1992 court order in
upstate New York that required demonstrators on
public streets and sidewalks to stay at least 15 feet
from abortion clinics as well as patients who
wanted to be left alone.
Lawyers for anti-abortion protesters said the
order violated free-speech rights while advancing a
"new constitutional right not to be hassled in
public."
If such a right is allowed to stand, it "will
swiftly encroach upon union picket lines, gay rights
activists and all other anti-establishment protesters
who hassle the American people by challenging the
status quo," the lawyers warned.
But abortion-rights advocates defended the
order as a rational means of protecting people from
being badgered at close range while allowing
demonstrators to use most of the sidewalks outside
clinics to wave signs and shout protests.
A Supreme Court decision, expected in early
1997, could clarify guidelines for anti-abortion
protests throughout the nation, some of which have
turned violent.
Monday, in the worst case of abortion clinic
violence in U.S. history, a Massachusetts jury
convicted John Salvi III of murdering two women at
abortion clinics.
In the dispute now before the Supreme Court,
U.S. District Judge Richard Arcara imposed buffer
zones in response to complaints that anti-abortion
protesters of Project Rescue had intimidated,
harassed and blockaded clinic patients and staff
members in Buffalo and Rochester, N.Y.
Two parts of Arcara's order are at issue. One
barred protesters from coming within 15 feet of
abortion clinic entrances and driveways, or patients
and vehicles entering or leaving the clinics.
Two "sidewalk counselors" were permitted to
enter the buffer zones to try to persuade women not
to have abortions.
But the second controversial part of the order
required that if a patient expressed a desire to be left
alone, the counselor must stop speaking and
withdraw.
By a 13-2 vote, the U.S. Court of Appeals in
New York approved both provisions.
"There is no right to invade the personal space
of individuals going about a lawful business, to dog
their footsteps or chase them down a street, to
scream or gesticulate in their faces . . . A
nose-to-nose confrontation is hardly essential to the
conveying of the protesters' views," Judge Ralph
Winter declared in an opinion joined by nine other
judges.
The dissenting judges accused their colleagues
of seriously infringing on the fundamental freedom
to speak freely on streets, sidewalks and other
public forums.
A key to the outcome of the case, the Rev. Paul
Schenck vs. Pro-Choice Network of Western New
York, will be the Supreme Court's interpretation of
its own 6-3 ruling in a 1994 abortion protest case
from Melbourne, Fla.
In that case, the justices allowed anti-abortion
demonstrators to be barred from getting within 36
feet of an abortion clinic - but struck down a ban on
approaching patients without their consent.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing the
majority opinion, issued this general legal test: A
judge's injunction would violate First Amendment
free-speech guarantees only if it stifles more speech
than necessary to serve a significant government
purpose.
Dissenting Justice Antonin Scalia warned then
that the high court had "left a powerful loaded
weapon lying about" that he said expanded the
power of courts to restrict protesters based on
minimal evidence.
About the same time, the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act went into effect. It provides
federal criminal and civil penalties for anyone
convicted of using force, threatening to use force or
physically obstructing clinics, their patients or
health-care workers
Copyright 1996 Knight-Ridder News Service
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PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN NEW YORK, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
Rev. Paul SCHENCKet al., Defendants.
67 F.3d 377
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued March 24, 1994.
Decided Sept. 6, 1994.
Argued in banc April 17,1995.
Decided Sept. 28, 1995.
OAKES, Senior Circuit Judge, with whom Chief Judge NEWMAN and Circuit Judges KEARSE, MINER,
WALKER, LEVAL, CALABRESI, CABRANES, and PARKER join:
This appeal was reheard in banc to reconsider the constitutionality of two provisions of an injunction
issued against abortion clinic protesters. One provision creates fifteen-foot buffer zones around abortion
clinic entrances, driveways, vehicles entering clinic driveways, and patients entering or leaving the clinics;
two "sidewalk counselors" are allowed in the buffer zones to "counsel" patients as they approach or leave the
clinics. The second provision requires that if a patient expresses a desire to be left alone, the counselors must
"cease and desist" and retreat to outside the buffer zone. The issue arises on an appeal by anti-abortion
protesters from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, Richard
J. Arcara, Judge, issuing the injunction. We hold that inclusion of the two provisions in the injunction was
proper, as they burden no more speech than necessary to further significant government interests. We
therefore vacate the portion of the panel opinion striking down these provisions, and we affirm these two
provisions as modified.
Background
[Several of the] Plaintiffs-Appellees are health care providers located in Western New York that offer
family planning and gynecological services, including abortion services, at their health care facilities.
Plaintiff-Appellee Pro-Choice Network of Western New York is a not-for-profit corporation based in
Buffalo, New York. Its primary goal is to maintain legal and safe access to family planning and abortion
services in the Western New York area.
While the Defendants were comprised of the organizations Project Rescue Western New York, Operation
Rescue and Project Life of Rochester, and fifty individuals who oppose abortion and have engaged in
demonstrations at or near abortion clinics in Western New York, the only Appellants are the individuals Rev.
Paul Schenck and Dwight Saunders.
I. The Lawsuit
This case commenced on September 24, 1990, when the Plaintiffs (collectively "Pro-Choice Network")
filed suit against the Defendants (collectively "Project Rescue") asserting seven causes of action.
Along with the complaint, Pro-Choice Network filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b) to enjoin a "blockade" the defendants had announced for September 28, 1990.
After a hearing, the district court issued a TRO enjoining defendants from "blockading" the plaintiffs'
medical facilities and from harassing the patients and staff entering or exiting those facilities. On September
28, 1990, the defendants complied with the TRO by holding a peaceful protest rather than a blockade.
Pro-Choice Network moved to have the TRO converted into a preliminary injunction. With the consent
of the parties, the district court ordered that the TRO would remain in effect until the motion for a
preliminary injunction was decided. While the motion was pending, Pro-Choice Network filed civil contempt
motions against six individual defendants and against Project Rescue, alleging violations of the TRO on six
separate occasions (though hearings on only five of these were held prior to the issuance of the preliminary
injunction).
II. The District Court Opinion
From March 6, 1991, to April 1, 1991, the district court held a hearing on the preliminary injunction
motion. The court also held hearings on the civil contempt motions intermittently from February 6, 1991,
through January 30, 1992....
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B. The Injunction
mhe district court found that Project Rescue's activities threatened to continue into the future, and unless
enjoined would cause clinic patients irreparable harm, including increased medical risks and the denial of
constitutionally protected rights. The court found that injunctive relief was required to prevent that harm.
On February 14, 1992, the court issued the injunction now at issue in this appeal....
The district court carefully reviewed the terms of the injunction to ensure that the provisions did not
violate Project Rescue's First Amendment rights. As the court's decision was issued before the Supreme
Court's recent opinion in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., the court applied the then-controlling law
on restrictions of time, place, and manner of expression, namely that the restrictions must be
(1) content-neutral, (2) narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and (3) leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of information. The court found that the injunction met all three
requirements.
Ill. The Appeal
Appellees petitioned this court for a rehearing in banc. On December 27, 1994, we ordered a rehearing
"limited to the issues of whether the District Court erred in including in the injunction the provision
concerning a fifteen- foot buffer zone and the 'cease and desist' provision."
Discussion
The sole issues before us on in banc rehearing are whether the district court erred in including in the
injunction (1) the 15-foot buffer zone provision and (2) the "cease and desist" provision. The issue before
us is solely whether the two contested provisions impermissibly infringe Project Rescue's First Amendment
right to freedom of speech.
The threshold issue is whether the injunction, taken as a whole, is content-based and accordingly subject
to strict scrutiny, or content- neutral--that is, justified "without reference to the content of the regulated
speech,"--and thus subject to less rigorous examination. In light of the Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Madsen, examining a similar injunction and finding it content-neutral, it is clear that the injunction as a whole
is not content-based. In Madsen, the Court concluded that the fact that an injunction "restricts only the
speech of antiabortion protestors" does not mean that it is content-directed. In the instant case, as in
Madsen, the injunction's purpose is both content- and viewpoint- neutral: the court imposed restrictions on
the demonstrators not to suppress their anti-abortion message but "incidental to their antiabortion message
because they repeatedly violated the court's original order." The injunction was imposed on Project Rescue
to prevent the irreparable harm that prospective patients would suffer if Project Rescue's "rescue" activities
continued to impede access to abortion services.
Since the injunction's purpose is content-neutral, we apply the test set out in Madsen to the contested
provisions: whether they "burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest."
As the Court explained, this test, while not amounting to the strict scrutiny that we have applied to
content-based restrictions of speech, is more rigorous than the test that has traditionally been applied to
content-neutral regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression. We apply more rigorous scrutiny
to an injunction which restricts expression than to legislation which does so, the Court reasoned, because
"[i]njunctions ... carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances."
In applying the Madsen test, we first examine whether the government interests identified by the district
court are significant. The district court identified three interests served by the injunction, which closely
parallel the three interests identified by the Court in Madsen. First, it noted, the government "has a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that an abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under
circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Second, the injunction "effectuates the significant
governmental interest of public safety" in that it prohibits defendants from blocking traffic entering and
leaving the clinics and from pushing or crowding persons as they enter or leave. Finally, by protecting
plaintiffs' rights to travel and to have an abortion, the injunction "serves the significant governmental interest
of ensuring 'that the constitutional rights of one group are not sacrificed in the interest of the constitutional
rights of another.' " We agree, as the Supreme Court did in Madsen that these governmental
interests--medical safety, public safety, and access to abortions-are entirely sufficient to justify an
appropriately tailored injunction to protect them. Accordingly, we turn to each of the contested provisions
of the injunction "to see if it burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish its goal."
I. The Buffer Zone
.... In short, this provision establishes what might be deemed a permeable buffer zone with a "floating"
fifteen foot radius: demonstrators must remain at least fifteen feet away from each entrance to an abortion
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facility, the entrance to its parking area and its driveways, and from women, doctors, and other staff at the
facility seeking access to or leaving the facility, with the exception that two "counselors" are allowed to enter
the buffer zone to engage in "non- threatening conversation" with each person or group of persons
approaching or leaving the facility.....
In evaluating whether the fifteen-foot buffer zone is more burdensome than necessary, we note that the
Supreme Court in Madsen found a thirty-six-foot buffer zone necessary to protect the government interests
enumerated in that case. The thirty-six-foot buffer zone in Madsen was in some ways broader and in some
ways narrower than the zone in this case. The Madsen zone was narrower in that, while it extended
thirty-six feet from clinic entrances, it did not, as in this case, "float" so as to protect persons approaching
or leaving the clinic. On the other hand, the Madsen zone was broader than the zone before us in two
significant ways. First, it extended-a more substantial distance--thirty-six feet from the clinic entrances.
Second, within that thirty-six-foot zone, the ban it imposed on speech was absolute: it admitted no "sidewalk
counselors" or any other form of advocacy within the zone....
In this case, the district court found the buffer zones necessary to effectuate both the goal of ensuring
access to the clinics as well as the goal of ensuring the safe performance of abortions. The district court
explained:
In crafting the injunction, the Court has been guided by the paramount need to maintain an
atmosphere conducive to the health care functions of plaintiffs' facilities. As the Supreme Court has
advised, in evaluating the need for and legitimacy of restrictions on expressive activity, courts must keep
in mind the normal functions of the location in question and whether the nature of the demonstration
activity is conducive to or disruptive of normal activities. Here, in the context of health care facilities
treating women who are already undergoing the stress normally associated with having an abortion, there
is an attendant need for a calm, quiet, stress-free atmosphere. Defendants' noisy, disruptive, invasive,
threatening and intimidating activities are clearly inappropriate in such a setting. The significant
governmental interest inherent in providing safe medical care to the public justifies certain carefully
drawn restrictions on defendants' expressive activities.
We find the district court's reasoning persuasive. In light of the extensive record documenting Project
Rescue's harassment and intimidation of patients, and documenting the effects produced by such harassment,
we cannot find the fifteen-foot buffer zone broader than necessary to protect patients' health and well-being.
The buffer zones are quite specifically tailored to effectuate the goals of the injunction. The protesters are
prohibited from demonstrating en masse only within a very short radius--fifteen feet--of clinic entrances,
parking lot entrances, driveways, and persons or vehicles "seeking access to or leaving" the clinics. Project
Rescue can still picket, carry signs, pray, sing or chant in full view of people going into the clinic or just
passing by. Within the fifteen-foot buffer, "sidewalk counselors" can engage in individualized, face-to-face
communication with persons entering the clinics in an effort to persuade such persons, on a personal level,
that abortion is wrong. This provision ensures that the injunction does not hamper Project Rescue's message,
only its intimidating method of demonstration....
In sum, we find the buffer zones fully justified by the record before us. Although the district court issued
the injunction without benefit of the Supreme Court's analysis in Madsen, we are fully able to apply the
Madsen standard to the record below. We conclude that the fifteen-foot buffer zones burden no more speech
than necessary to accomplish the govemmental interests at stake in this case.
II. The "Cease and Desist" Provision
We next examine whether the "cease and desist" provision "burden[s] no more speech than necessary
to serve a significant government interest." This provision confers on women seeking access to abortion
facilities the right to refuse counseling at an intimate range within the buffer zone.
The Madsen Court struck down a provision which ordered demonstrators not to approach any person
within 300 feet of the clinic who is seeking the clinic's services "unless such person indicates a desire to
communicate."... .The categorical "no-uninvited-approach" order of the Madsen trial court is significantly
different from the "cease and desist" provision before us. That order gave no opportunity to anti-abortion
counselors to proffer their advice at an intimate range unless the counselees "indicate[d] a desire to
communicate by approaching or by inquiring of the [counselors]." They were obliged to remain on the
opposite side of the street. Even a woman who was willing to receive such counseling could not receive it
unless she affirmatively sought it out. This order, in contrast, permits two counselors, acting in a
non-threatening manner, to approach for counseling unless the recipient affirmatively refuses to receive such
counseling at an intimate range. Thus the "cease and desist" provision is far more solicitous of the
demonstrators' interest in approaching their target audience face-to-face and delivering their message. They
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may approach without being invited and need not retreat unless expressly rejected by a counselee, and then
only to a distance of fifteen feet.
Thus interpreted, the provision that the parties have dubbed "cease and desist" may more accurately be
deemed the "walk away" provision. The purpose of this provision is not, as Project Rescue asserts, to
suppress speech because of the anxiety its content produces in its audience, but rather to provide a vulnerable
group of medical patients with some relief from the duress caused by unwelcome physical proximity to an
extremely vocal group of demonstrators. This purpose is content-neutral, as it is the demonstrators' physical
proximity which is regulated rather than their message.
The district court clearly found that, absent this provision, women seeking access to the clinics were
"captive" to Project Rescue's invasive conduct and unable to "walk away":
Defendants surround the facilities and force women seeking access to them to run a gauntlet of
demonstrators, picketers and "sidewalk counselors." The evidence adduced at the hearings clearly shows
that, even when women seeking access to the clinics signal their desire to be left alone, defendants
continue to follow right alongside them and persist in communicating their message. It is obvious,
therefore, that women seeking access to plaintiffs' facilities cannot, as a practical matter, escape
defendants' message. Defendants' aggressive conduct makes it impossible for women entering the clinics
simply to avert their eyes or cover their ears in order to avoid receiving defendants' message. The only
choice women have if they want to avoid the message is to forego their constitutional right to have an
abortion. Thus, women entering plaintiffs' clinics are a "captive audience" for defendants' message and
the "cease and desist" provision of the injunction is warranted.
The courts have recognized the rights of "captive audiences" to be free not only of unwanted speech
occurring outside traditional public fora, but even in traditional fora, in which First Amendment rights are
at their zenith, when circumstances indicate a heightened need to protect the right of the listener to be left
alone, the courts have done so. In Madsen, the Court acknowledged that an abortion clinic, with the medical
risks attendant thereto, presents such circumstances.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that both the buffer zone provision and the "cease and
desist" provision are constitutional. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the panel opinion striking down
these provisions, and we affirm these provisions as modified. The remainder of the district court's order,
which is not before this in banc court, remains affirmed by the panel's opinion.
WINTER, Circuit Judge, with whom NEWMAN, Chief Judge, KEARSE, MAHONEY, McLAUGHLIN,
JACOBS, WALKER, LEVAL, CALABRESI, and CABRANES, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in the
result: [OMITTED]
JACOBS, Circuit Judge, with whom MAHONEY, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring in the result: [OMITTED]
MESKILL, Circuit Judge, dissenting (with whom Judge ALTIMARI concurs):
Today thirteen of this Court's judges give approval to an injunction that seriously infringes on the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and expression.
A careful examination of the entire record in this case should lead to one conclusion: the inclusion of
both the buffer zone and the cease and desist provisions in the injunction fails the analysis enunciated in
Madsen v. Women's Health Center.
Indeed, as I read the record, what was done by appellants--the picketing, the leafletting, the voicing of
protest--was done in the finest tradition of the First Amendment, hardly justifying so sweeping an
abridgement of free speech. Regrettably, the majority today concludes otherwise, embarking this Court on
an ill-fated journey whose destination is the dilution of the public forum doctrine, the very core of the First
Amendment. To such a result I cannot agree.
I
Judge Oakes' opinion properly acknowledges that the Madsen standard is the appropriate starting point
for our analysis of the injunction in this case. Yet, remarkably, the analysis fails to adhere to Madsen even
once, as evidenced by the opinion's ultimate approval of two provisions of an injunction that clearly ban
significantly more speech than necessary to achieve the injunction's legitimate goals.
A. The Buffer Zone
One who reads the Oakes opinion must wonder how any disagreement (let alone a dissent) could exist
among members of this Court regarding the so-called buffer zone, given that the opinion leaves the
unmistakable impression that the facts of this case are so similar to those in Madsen. This impression is
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no accident; indeed, it is purposefully created. For without this mischaracterization the opinion simply could
not fit this case into the Madsen rule.
This appeal also involves demonstrations outside abortion clinics. Unlike Madsen, however, our case
does not, as the district court specifically found, involve a full-fledged "blockade." Rather, on the public
sidewalks in front of family planning clinics in the Western District of New York, a group of five to forty
activists distributed literature about abortion and abortion alternatives, engaged in "sidewalk counseling" in
an effort to inform and educate, picketed, carried signs, sang, participated in prayer vigils, chanted and
shouted anti-abortion slogans. The record, moreover, is clear: the protestors obeyed, not disobeyed, the
district court's temporary restraining order (TRO), which prohibited them from blocking access to the clinics.
With this more accurate picture of the record in mind, I address the constitutionality of the buffer zone....
The inescapable conclusion is that "the [buffer] zone provision ... forbids conduct even beyond that
which would obstruct or impede access." Indeed, within the fifleen-foot buffer zone, the preliminary
injunction restricts such sacrosanct First Amendment conduct as holding a placard containing an antiabortion
message, passive leafletting or handbilling, silent picketing and even the mere voicing of protest. The
Supreme Court, however, consistently has confirmed not only the constitutionally protected status of such
activities but their importance in our society. In light of the extensive protection provided to patients by the
other provisions of the injunction, the district court had to establish a specific need for the additional blanket
prohibitions imposed by the buffer zone. Here, the record simply does not support such a need....
Further demonstrating its failure to adhere to the newly enunciated Madsen test, the Oakes opinion
factors that appellants "can still picket, carry signs, pray, sing or chant in full view of people going into the
clinic or just passing by," into its analysis. Considerations of whether the injunction leaves open alternative
channels of communication is an element under the previously used time, place, and manner test and is not
controlling here. As Madsen made clear, "standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently
rigorous" in evaluating injunctions restricting expressive conduct.
B. The Cease and Desist Provision
I next turn to the cease and desist provision. Judge Oakes today declares that those entering or leaving
an abortion clinic comprise a special group of privileged citizens, immune from the rigors imposed by the
First Amendment and constitutionally permitted, by virtue of their decision to have an abortion, to muzzle
those expressing disagreement with their ultimate choice. In its haste to silence those attempting to dissuade
women from terminating their pregnancies, however, the Oakes opinion ignores the First Amendment's
"longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional
impact on the audience."
Here, as in Madsen, no evidence was introduced before the district court indicating that the attempts of
the sidewalk counselors at communicating with the prospective patients, however emotionally charged those
encounters might have been, transcended the bounds of protected speech.
Judge Oakes seeks to avoid the controlling ramifications of Madsen and to justify a total departure from
its holding by seizing on any distinction, however insignificant, between the two cases. Thus, he tells us that
the cease and desist provision here "is far more solicitous of the demonstrators' right to approach their target
audience" than the one examined in Madsen as the provision does not completely prohibit sidewalk
counselors from initiating conversation with potential counselees. This difference, while real, can hardly
serve as the basis for such disparate treatment. Both provisions similarly prove problematic in that they
confer on potential counselees the right to control the ability of the sidewalk counselors to engage in
otherwise protected expressive speech in a public forum. Indeed, while the cease and desist provision
provides for no express consent requirement, as did the no approach provision in Madsen, it does so sub
silentio, and thereby runs afoul of the First Amendment.
Judge Oakes attempts to circumvent this well-entrenched tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence by
reliance on the captive audience doctrine. But it is only where an unreceptive audience is truly "captive" that
courts will assure the listener protection from offensive speech.
It is difficult to see how a person approaching a clinic on a public street or sidewalk can feel a captive
of two counselors who are limited to non-threatening speech and are prohibited from "physically abusing,
grabbing, touching, pushing, shoving or crowding" the entrant. Judge Oakes' opinion today pushes the
captive audience doctrine further than any appellate court has ever gone--and to a holding completely
unsupported by any precedent in our case law. ... While counselors may cause distress to those attempting
to enter the clinics, such offense is an inevitable cost of free expression under the First Amendment.
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Further, Judge Oakes' reasoning leads me to question the content (and viewpoint) neutrality of the cease
and desist provision. He claims that it is the demonstrators' physical proximity that is regulated rather than
their message, thus making the provision content and viewpoint neutral. Testimony largely ignored by the
opinion, however, indicates that another "extremely vocal group," the group of patient escorts, is allowed to
get physically close to this "vulnerable group of medical patients," often even closer than the sidewalk
counselors themselves.
If the cease and desist provision truly was aimed at extremely vocal groups who come within "unwelcome
physical proximity" to clinic patients, then the escorts no doubt should be included in the injunction's
coverage. That they are not leads to an inescapable conclusion: Judge Oakes' term "unwelcome" does not
refer to the physical proximity of the demonstrators, but to their message. Such censorship is entirely
impermissible under the First Amendment.
Where Judge Winter and I part company is in his apparent belief that we may uphold an injunction that
sweepingly denies appellants their constitutional right to express their views peaceably without an extensive
record documenting coercive, obstructionist or violent conduct....
III
I am confident that the members of our Court will soon come to regret the damage wrought to our First
Amendment jurisprudence. Under either rationale offered for today's result the Court effectively reduces
Madsen 's "burdens no more speech than necessary" test to a mere cliche. I dissent.
ALTIMARI, Circuit Judge, dissenting: [OMITTED]
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v. ARIZONA
Employees-English-only requirement- First
Amendment.
Ruling below (Yniguez v. Arizonans for Offi-
cial English, CA 9, 69 F.3d 920, 64 LW 2219):
English-only provision of Arizona Constitution,
which generally prohibits use of any other lan-
guage by all officers and employees of all political
subdivisions of state while performing their offi-
cial acts, is facially overbroad in violation of First
Amendment.
Questions presented: (I) Does state constitu-
tional provision declaring English official lan-
guage of state and requiring English to be used to
perform official acts violate First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause? (2) Does government em-
ployee have free speech right to disregard official
language and choose language in which to per-
form official actions? (3) Do petitioners have
standing to maintain this action? (4) Is there case
or controversy with respect to respondent
Yniguez?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/20/95, by
Barnaby W. Zall, and Williams & Jensen P.C.,
both of Washington, D.C.
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ENGLISH-ONLY CASE TO GET COURT REVIEW
Arizona Law Covers Government Business
The Washington Post
Tuesday, March 26, 1996
Joan Biskupic
Confronting one of the nation's most divisive
topics, the Supreme Court announced yesterday it
will review the constitutionality of an Arizona law
that makes English the official language and forces
state employees to conduct business in English only.
The 1988 law, an amendment to Arizona's
constitution, was challenged by a state employee
who handled medical malpractice claims against the
state and spoke both Spanish and English to
claimants, depending on their need. The worker,
Maria-Kelley Yniguez, said the "English only"
mandate violated her right to free speech.
The Arizona conflict has played out nationally
as 23 states have made English their official
language, and legislation to do the same on the
federal level is pending in Congress. In this region,
Virginia has a largely symbolic law that declares
English to be the official language of the state but
does not prohibit public employees from
distributing information in other languages.
At stake in those efforts and the court case are
competing American traditions of multicultural
tolerance and a quest for unity through a common
language. Like the debate on immigration, the
controversy also invokes anxieties about foreigners
and perceived assaults on a traditional way of life.
The conflict is part of the presidential
campaign, too, as GOP candidates Patrick J.
Buchanan and Senate Majority Leader Robert J.
Dole (Kan.), the party's presumptive nominee, have
proclaimed they want the American people to speak
a single language. They have offered various
proposals for English only in public schools and the
federal government. President Clinton has said
opposition to bilingual culture conflicts with the
nation's values.
The question in the Arizona case is whether
forcing state employees to communicate only in
English violates their rights to free speech. ("English
only" restrictions vary among the states. Most are
merely symbolic declarations, like Virginia's, that
make the English language official. Arizona has
gone the furthest, according to court filings, by
demanding that state employees conduct all their
business in English. Its provisions do, however,
allow exceptions for non-English languages to
protect the rights of criminal defendants and victims
of crime.)
- The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in a
decision the Supreme Court agreed to review, said
the Arizona law violates government workers' free
speech. By a 6 to 5 vote, the appeals court ruled
that a person's choice of language was a speech
right It said requiring official acts to be conducted
only in English also discriminated against Hispanics
and other minorities because it "significantly
interferes with the ability of the non-English
speaking populace of Arizona to receive information
and ideas."
"The protection of the Constitution extends to
all, to those who speak other languages as well as
those born with English on the tongue," Judge
Stephen Reinhardt wrote for the majority, using
language from a 1923 Supreme Court case.
"Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had
ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this
cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with
the Constitution -- a desirable end cannot be
promoted by prohibited means."
In appealing that decision to the Supreme Court,
a group known as Arizonans for Official English
argue that a public employee's choice of language is
not a constitutionally protected speech right. The
group referred to a dissenting opinion by 9th Circuit
Judge Alex Kozinski countering the majority's view
that government employees have a personal stake in
the words they speak in their official capacities.
"The force of this idea will turn government
employment into a platform for endless attacks on
government policy," Kozinski said.
Proponents of "official English" say states
should be able to encourage people to speak a single
language. David A. Price, a lawyer with the
Washington Legal Foundation, which, along with 21
members of Congress, submitted a "friend of the
court" brief in favor of the Arizona law, stressed
yesterday the unifying nature of a common
language.
"The idea that it is exclusionary overlooks the
history of the country, in which generation upon
generation of immigrants have come here and
learned English and succeeded," Price said.
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While the Supreme Court agreed to review the
basic constitutional question, it also threw up a flare
that its ruling could be more procedural than
substantive. It issued an order saying it would also
examine whether the group Arizonans for Official
English had legal standing to intervene in the case.
After the state of Arizona lost the case at the
district court level, then-Gov. Rose Mofford, who
had criticized the amendment, did not have the state
launch an appeal. So the citizens group intervened
to take the matter to the 9th Circuit. The appeals
court ruled that because the organization was the
principal sponsor of the ballot initiative, it had "a
strong interest" in defending the amendment in the
courts and could step into the state's position.
The Supreme Court also said it would consider
whether Yniguez, who was never subject to any
state action and now works for a private firm, still
has a case.
Yniguez's lawyer, Robert J. Pohlman, said
yesterday he hopes the 9th Circuit ruling striking
down the Arizona law survives Supreme Court
scrutiny. On the core constitutional issue, he relies
on a 1923 Supreme Court case striking down a
Nebraska law that forbade a teacher to use any
language other than English.
The Arizona law, which was narrowly adopted
with 50.5 percent of the vote, was immediately
suspended because of the court challenge, but
Pohlman said that if it were allowed to take effect,
people who did not speak English would be unable
to do business with the state, from paying taxes to
seeking needed services.
The case of Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona will be argued next fall.
The Washington Post Copyright 1996
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ENGLISH-ONLY APPEAL GOES TO SUPREME COURT
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, March 26, 1996
David G. Savage
In the face of a growing backlash over the
use of Spanish as a second language in much of
the nation, the Supreme Court said Monday that
it would consider reviving an Arizona voter
initiative that makes English the only language
for "all government functions and actions."
In a brief order, the justices agreed to hear an
appeal filed by a group known as "Arizonans for
Official English," which sponsored the measure
in 1988. Its leaders said that the government not
only must recognize English as the "official
language" but use it in all of its daily dealings
with the public.
Twenty-three states, including California,
have adopted measures declaring English their
"official language," but most do not go as far as
the Arizona initiative.
Last year, a U.S. appeals court, on a 6-5
vote, struck down the Arizona measure for
violating the free-speech rights of a
Spanish-speaking state employee.
The Supreme Court, led by two conservative
Arizonans--Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor--appears
inclined to reverse that ruling.
In recent years, the high court generally has
upheld the wishes of the majority of voters and
limited the free-speech rights of public
employees.
For example, in a closely watched abortion
case in 1991, the court said doctors and nurses
who take federal funds do not have a free-speech
right to encourage abortion. Writing for the
court, Rehnquist said public employees do not
have a right to espouse a message that conflicts
with the views of the government that employs
them.
Lawyers for the English-only advocates cited
that decision as precedent for reversing the
appeals court.
A Supreme Court ruling reviving the
"English-only" amendment could spur the
backlash against immigration and encourage
cutbacks in services for non-English-speaking
newcomers.
In the Republican primaries, Senate Majority
Leader Bob Dole (R-Kan.) and his prime
challenger, commentator Patrick J. Buchanan,
have called for a federal declaration of English as
the nation's official language.
Still, the court case is likely to have more
symbolic importance than practical impact.
In Arizona, even proponents of the
"English-only" amendment conceded that the
state will continue to offer bilingual education in
classrooms and bilingual ballots in the voting
booth. That is so, they said, because federal law
requires it.
They agreed even that a government official
can speak Spanish to a Spanish-speaking person
who seeks a driver's license, welfare aid or any
other public benefit.
Robert D. Park, a retired federal immigration
agent from Prescott who headed the group that
sponsored the Arizona initiative, agreed that the
measure would not have much real effect in the
state if upheld by the Supreme Court.
"Its not going to change much. We have
never maintained [that] it requires the exclusion
of services" in the native language for those who
do not speak English, Park said in a telephone
interview.
But, he added, most voters want to stop the
move "toward greater and greater
accommodation to other languages. We believe
all state documents must be in English only."
In 1986, Califomia's voters overwhelmingly
approved a state constitutional amendment
declaring English the official language of the
state. But officials in Sacramento said that
measure did not change how the government
operates and will not be directly affected by the
outcome in the Arizona dispute.
The Arizona case is muddled by procedural
problems, leaving open the possibility that the
justices could void the lower court decision
without deciding whether an English-only rule is
constitutional.
In the order agreeing to hear the case
(Arizonans for Official English vs. Arizona,
95-974), the high court told the lawyers that it
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also wanted to hear arguments on whether the
citizens group had "standing" to appeal the lower
court decision and whether a "case or
controversy" remained after the
Spanish-speaking employee quit the state
service.
The dispute prompted a fierce battle in the
lower courts.
It began in November 1988, when Arizona's
voters, by a razor-thin -majority of. 50.5%,-
approved the broad measure. It said that "the
English language is the language of the ballot,
the public schools and all government functions
and actions" and is to be used by "all government
officials and employees during the performance
of government business."
The entire hierarchy of state officials had
opposed the initiative. A lawsuit challenging the
measure was brought on behalf of Maria-Kelley
Yniquez, a bilingual state employee who said
that she often needed to speak Spanish to people
who came to her state office seeking
information.
In response, the state attorney general's
office issued a statement saying that the
amendment "does not prohibit the use of other
languages when they are reasonably required in
the day-to-day operation of government."
Nonetheless, a federal judge in Phoenix
invalidated the measure, and then-Gov. Rose
Mofford refused to appeal. Arizonans for
Official English appealed to the U.S. 9th Circuit
Court, but lost.
"The state cannot, consistent with the First
Amendment, gag the employees currently
providing members of the public with
information," wrote Judge Stephen Reinhardt of
Los Angeles.
In dissent, Judge Alex Kozinski said public
employees do have a free-speech right to say
what they want on their own time, but they do
not have a right to defy the wishes of the voters.
The high court will hear the case in the fall.
The justices also agreed to review a second
opinion written by Reinhardt, this one in an
environmental dispute.
The Endangered Species Act allows "any
person" to file a lawsuit to enforce its provisions.
Under that clause, two Oregon ranchers sued,
saying the government went too far in protecting
the shortnose sucker, an endangered fish.
Reinhardt, speaking for the 9th Circuit,
threw out the suit on grounds that it did not seek
to further the aim of the law. But the court
agreed to hear an appeal filed by the ranchers
(Bennett vs. Plenert, 95-813).
Copyright, The Times Mirror Company; Los
Angeles Times 1996 all Rights reserved
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ENGLISH-ONLY LAW GOES TO HIGH COURT
Los Angeles Daily News
Tuesday, March 26, 1996
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder Tribune News Wire
The controversial drive to make English the
official language of government, which already has
seeped into this year's presidential election
campaign, soon will undergo its first Supreme Court
test.
On Monday, the justices agreed to weigh the
validity of the toughest of the nation's language
restrictions - a 1988 Arizona constitutional
amendment that requires English to be "the
language of the ballot, the public schools and all
government functions and actions."
The outcome of the case, which will be argued
in the fall and decided in the first half of 1997, could
have widespread effect on an increasingly
multilingual nation.
Behind the dispute are two conflicting sets of
American values. One stresses the need for a
common culture that speeds assimilation of
foreign-born children and reduces the "Babel" of
multiple languages. The other tradition emphasizes
the benefits of a tolerance that avoids repression of
languages and permits a variety of cultures to
flourish.
Census figures show that the numbers of U.S.
residents who speak a foreign language at home are
increasing. From 1980 to 1990, the number who
speak Spanish grew by 56 percent; the number of
Chinese speakers increased 109 percent.
In all, nearly 32 million people over the age of
5 - 14 percent of all U.S. residents - speak a foreign
language at home, according to the U.S. Census
Bureau. That's up from 11 percent in 1980.
California is among the 21 states and more than
40 cities that have enacted laws or amendments
declaring English their official tongue. In most
states, however, the adopted policies are largely
symbolic.
The Arizona case accepted for Supreme Court
review stems from a lawsuit filed by Maria-Kelley
F. Yniguez, a bilingual state employee who spoke
English or Spanish while evaluating medical
malpractice claims in 1988.
She complained that forcing her to stop
speaking Spanish violated her First Amendment
rights of free speech. It was necessary for her to
speak Spanish on the job as "kind of a solidarity
thing" and "to demonstrate my belief that Arizona
enjoys a pluralistic society," she said.
Jaime Gutierrez, a Latino state senator, joined
the suit, saying he was afraid he would be sued if he
continued to speak to his constituents in Spanish.
Last year, the appeals court for eight Western
states and Hawaii voted 6-5 to strike down
Arizona's English-only amendment as coercive,
overly broad, damaging to government efficiency,
- and unfair to state residents, especially Latinos.
Arizona ranks fourth among states in the percentage
of Latino residents (19 percent).
One's choice of language is as protected by the
First Amendment as the content of one's speech,
Judge Stephen Reinhardt observed in the majority
opinion. "Language is by definition speech, and the
regulation of any language is the regulation of
speech," he said.
The amendment was so broad that "the Arizona
state universities would be barred from issuing
diplomas in Latin and judges performing (Jewish)
weddings would be prohibited from saying 'Mazel
Tov' as part of the official marriage ceremony," said
Reinhardt, whose liberal opinions have not fared
well at the conservative Supreme Court.
Dissenters said that choice of language doesn't
qualify as speech and that the general public and
state employees have no constitutional right to insist
that government services be performed in languages
other than English.
Particularly vehement objections came from
Alex Kosinski, a conservative judge who said
Reinhar&s opinion would give state employees "the
right to turn every policy disagreement into a federal
lawsuit."
"Since they (Arizonans) were paying Yniguez's
salary, I had assumed it was their call whether
Yniguez spent her work time processing claims,
promoting English or twiddling her thumbs,"
Kosinski declared.
Reinhardt retorted in a counterattack aimed at
Kosinski: "His would be an Orwellian world in
which Big Brother would compel its minions to say
'War is Peace' and 'Peace is War' . . . Judge
Kosinski's view of the rights of
non-English-speaking persons would make the
Statue of Liberty weep."
In agreeing to hear the case, however, the
Supreme Court raised the possibility that it may not
reach the free-speech issues. The justices requested
arguments- on whether Arizonans for Official
English, which sponsored the amendment, has a
right to appeal when the state government declined
to do so.
Copyright 1996 Knight-Ridder Tribune
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"OFFICIAL ENGLISH" CASE GOES TO JUSTICES
Court May Limit Right to Defend Law
The Washington Times
Tuesday, March 26, 1996
Frank J. Murray
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to take
a case on whether governments may require
employees to speak only English at work, the
flash-point issue in the national "official English"
debate.
Justices framed the issue in a way that
suggests they'll decide the case on the question of
when private citizens are allowed to defend an
initiative in court if governments will not.
Lawyers on both sides predicted that instead
of deciding the English-only question, the
Supreme Court will overtum a 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals decision because of what is
known as "standing" to bring lawsuits.
A ruling that citizens can't sue to enforce a
ballot initiative could emasculate the growing
voter-initiative movement by allowing state
officials to nullify an outcome they always
opposed.
Questions on standing also figure
prominently in another case accepted yesterday.
In each case, the majority opinion was written by
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the 9th Circuit in
Los Angeles.
The ruling in the second case, from Oregon,
allowed citizens to invoke the federal
Endangered Species Act in lawsuits only when
seeking to increase governmental protection for
a species.
English-only is an inflammatory issue, but 23
states have adopted some version of the concept,
though many are as ceremonial as official
flowers or birds.
The high court agreed to consider a 1988
Arizona voter initiative that passed with 50.5
percent of the vote. The ban included widely
spoken Spanish and Indian dialects, barring
government use of non-English languages except
to protect public health and safety, guarantee
rights of crime victims and defendants, comply
with federal laws on such things as bilingual
ballots and voter information, and teach
languages.
The appellate court said the Arizona
constitutional amendment violates state
employees' free-speech rights under the U.S.
Constitution.
A bill offered by Rep. Bill Emerson,
Missouri Republican, with 193 co-sponsors
would outlaw federal use of languages other than
English to distribute government information and
operate the decennial census but would not
affect the courts. The bill awaits action in the
House Economic and Educational Opportunities
Committee.
A recent General Accounting Office study
cites 256 instances of materials using 12
languages other than English, a spokesman for
Mr. Emerson said.
The Arizona ballot initiative was led by
Robert D. Park, a retired Immigration and
Naturalization Service criminal investigator who
spoke English and Spanish in his job. He said
such votes may not change much, but they send
a big message.
"This issue is getting the attention of the
federal government more than anything else.
No. 1, it stops the trend toward official
bilingualism and multilingualism," Mr. Park said.
He called it strange the justices would raise
the issue now.
"The fact is that the governor at that time,
Rose Mofford, just flat washed her hands of it.
The attorney general was out of it too. We had
to get in it," Mr. Park said.
He was surprised but not discouraged when
justices asked attorneys for both sides to argue
procedural issues related to his right to appeal
and to the dispute's status as a live issue after the
Spanish-speaking worker who filed the original
case quit her job.
When she filed the suit Nov. 10, 1988, two
days after the initiative changed the state
Constitution, Maria-Kelley Yniguez was a
first-year law student evaluating
medical-malpractice claims against the state.
Lower courts said she kept her interest alive
merely by appealing a $1 judgment she won.
Miss Yniguez testified she used Spanish on
the job as "kind of a solidarity thing" and to
convey concepts inexpressible in English,
including cultural heritage.
"It seems to me that the courts looking for a
way to get rid of that horrible 9th Circuit opinion
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without reaching the issue of official English,"
said Anthony T. Caso of the Pacific Legal
Foundation in Sacramento, Calif., which backs
Mr. Park and Arizonans for Official English.
"Generally, you can't sue a state in federal
court for any reason. To sue to get them to
follow their own law is more difficult," he said.
Stephen G. Montoya of Phoenix, who
represents Arizonans Against Constitutional
Tampering, which opposes the English-only
measure, said, "I think it's not unlikely that it will
be decided on those grounds."
The use of other languages "doesn't in any
way undermine the efficient operation of the
state," he said. "In fact, it increases state
efficiency because many state residents who
must communicate with their government only
speak Spanish, only speak Navajo, only speak
Hopi."
The Washington Times Copyright 1996
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95-1184 GLICKMAN v. WILEMAN BROTHERS
& ELLIOTT INC.
Marketing orders-Funding of generic advertising
programs-First Amendment.
Ruling below (Wileman Brothers & Elliott
Inc. v. Espy, CA 9, 58 F.3d 1367):
Department of Agriculture's marketing orders
for California peaches, nectarines, and plums
under Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, in
compelling growers, handlers, and processors to
expend funds each year for generic advertising
conducted by industry marketing committees ap-
pointed by secretary of agriculture, do not direct-
ly advance government's interest in promoting
fruit growing industries because generic advertis-
ing program is not shown to be better at increas-
ing consumption than individualized advertising,
and orders are not narrowly tailored because they
lack mechanism for crediting plaintiffs' own ad-
vertising and allow free-riding by non-paying
growers, handlers, and processors in states other
than California; accordingly, generic advertising
provision violates plaintiffs' First Amendment
rights.
Question presented: Does it violate First
Amendment for secretary of agriculture, pursu-
ant to marketing orders issued under 1937 Agri-
cultural Marketing Agreement Act, to require
handlers of California peaches, nectarines, and
plums to fund generic advertising programs for
those commodities?
Petition for certiorari filed 1/24/96, by Drew
S. Days III, Sol. Gen., Frank W. Hunger, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Edwin S. Kneedler, Dpty. Sol. Gen.,
Richard H. Seamon, Asst. to Sol. Gen., and
Douglas N. Letter, Irene M. Solet, and Daniel
Bensing, Justice Dept. Attys.
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COURT TO TACKLE CROP MARKETING
Some Growers Balking at Mandatory Fees
The Sacramento Bee
Tuesday, June 4, 1996
Herbert A. Sample, Bee Washington Bureau
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday said it
would review a 1930s-era marketing program for
California peaches, plums and nectarines, a case that.
could affect tens of millions of dollars worth of
farm-product promotions like the dancing
"California Raisins." At issue are scores of state and
federal "marketing orders" --
government-sanctioned programs that levy
assessments on fruit and vegetable farmers, and
milk, egg and beef producers, to finance common
product advertisements.
"Its going to have a fallout (on) every mandated
assessment program in the nation," said Bruce
Obbink, president of the Tablegrape Growers
Commission. "From 'Got Milk?' to 'Pork, the Other
White Meat,' to the dancing California Raisins, all
of those programs are going to be impacted."
Fifteen California growers of peaches,
nectarines and plums brought the lawsuit, arguing
that it violates their free speech rights and imposes
costs that are passed on to consumers.
"My clients . . . want the government out of
their life," said Thomas Campagne, a lawyer
representing the growers. "They'd rather keep the
money and spend it advertising their own variety,
their own logo, in their own way." Campagne said
the peach, nectarine and plum growers in California
were assessed $20 million last year to finance
promotions. But defenders of marketing orders,
principally other farmers, contend the system's
frequently ubiquitous promotions have greatly
expanded the number of consumers who eat beef or
cheese, drink milk or buy flowers.
"These people are not required to belong to a
club or swear some sort of oath," said Bob Hedrick,
who represents 44 marketing order programs in
California and a handful of other states. "Their only
connection with this program is in the payment of
assessments," he added. "That we think is similar to
mandatory bar dues (imposed on lawyers) or
mandatory union dues, both of which have been
upheld over the years."
The court, which will hear oral arguments on the
case sometime after convening its 1996-97 term in
October, will examine a system that spawned a
number of memorable advertisements, including the
animated raisins.
More recently, marketing order campaigns
extolled California cheese -- "it's the cheese." A
number of other states maintain similar programs,
such as those promoting Washington apples or
Idaho potatoes. The marketing order that the court
will focus on imposes sometimes hefty mandatory
assessments. Gerawan Farming and Packing Co. of
Reedley, a principal in the lawsuit before the court,
was assessed $675,000 last year, Campagne said.
While farmers are free to promote their own
products, many cannot afford to do so while
financing generic ads that often highlight rival
varieties of the three fruits, said Brian Leighton, a
Clovis lawyer who represents other farmers battling
marketing orders. "My clients believe they have a
superior product and they want to differentiate their
products from others," Leighton said. "I'll be
damned if I am going to give money to a bunch of
competitors who then decide how they will advertise
generically."
Forcing farmers to pay for promotion
campaigns that competitors may control violates the
farmers' free-speech rights, Leighton contended.
That argument was rejected by a federal district
court judge. But the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals backed the 15 California farmers, noting
that the freedom of speech prevents a person from
being "compelled to render financial support for
others' speech."
Micheal Marsh, director of administration for
the California Almond Board, said mandatory fees
boosted consumption. Sales between 1975 and 1995
increased by 300 percent, he said.
Further, said Obbink, the forces of nature have
more impact on consumer prices for fruits such as
grapes than marketing orders.
And Hedrick noted that marketing orders are
first sanctioned by state lawmakers and then must
be approved by a majority of the farmers who are to
be assessed. A handful have been disbanded after
the farmers voted for repeal.
California Attomey General Dan Lungren and
the Clinton administration back the marketing order
system.
(Bee staff writer Emily Otani contributed to this
report.)
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SUPREME COURT WILL REAR AD CASE
At Issue Are Generic Campaigns Financed by Farming Groups
The Fresno Bee
Tuesday, June 4, 1996
Sanford Nax & Dennis Pollock
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to hear
a far-reaching Valley-born case that will decide
whether the government can force growers and
shippers to pay for advertising their products.
At stake is $750 million to $1 billion spent
nationally each year by the quasi-governmental
marketing order agencies that organize advertising
campaigns such as "Got Milk?" and "Eat Beef."
Specifically, the Supreme Court is being asked
to review a 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruling
that said generic advertising violated the First
Amendment right of growers who wanted to conduct
their own advertising and marketing of peaches,
plums and nectarines.
This is believed to be the first noncriminal case
from the Valley to go before the Supreme Court in
23 years.
It also would be the first generic marketing case
to reach the court since marketing orders were
created in the 1930s.
"This is probably as big a local story from the
Supreme Court as any we've had in many years,"
said Kendall Manock, a Fresno-based lawyer who
represents the stone-fruit coalition, a group of
packers involved in the case.
The trip to the Supreme Court started in 1988
when Fresno lawyer Tom Campagne sued the U.S.
Department of Agriculture on behalf of Wileman
Bros. & Elliott Inc., Gerawan Farming, and Kash
Inc., plus 13 other tree fruit growers in the Valley.
Campagne argued the mandatory assessments
violated his clients' right to free speech because they
forced the growers to support their competitors'
varieties.
The 9th Circuit ruled in favor of Campagne, and
the federal government appealed to the Supreme
Court.
He will argue his case before the high court,
probably in the fall.
The Supreme Court gave no reason for agreeing
to hear the case, which is one of 35 the court will
hear in its next term. Between 7,000 and 8,000
cases were petitioned for review.
But Manock said the high court probably wants
to resolve an apparent conflict in the lower courts.
The 9th Circuit, in the tree fruit case, said
mandatory assessments are not constitutional. The
3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in Pennsylvania,
issuing a conflicting ruling in a beef case, said
otherwise.
The Valley case also has national implications,
which likely drew the high court's attention. The
National Association of State Departments of
Agriculture and 14 attorneys general filed briefs
urging the case be heard.
The programs are controversial. There are 11
cases pending in the courts, many of them filed by
Brian Leighton, a Clovis lawyer who opposes
generic marketing programs.
Since 1992, programs that have been besieged
by court challenges include:
* The California Cut Flower Commission.
* The California Apple Commission.
* The California Grape Root Stock
Improvement Commission.
* The California Kiwifruit Commission.
Leighton said he thinks the Supreme Court will
uphold the 9th Circuit decision finding the
assessments unconstitutional.
"These programs are just so socialistic," said
Leighton. He added that "attorneys, CEOs of
commissions and ag economists are getting rich."
REVIEW WELCOMED
Representatives of commodity groups
welcomed the court review as a step toward
addressing the conflicting court decisions. "We
would like to have the issue settled not only for this
marketing order but for marketing orders all over
the country," said Marilyn Watkins of the
Reedley-based California Tree Fruit Agreement.
Mark Houston, chairman ofa coalition of 15 of
California's commodity organizations, said
conflicting rulings have presented "no clear test that
makes any sense; how are farmers going to compete
with the state of the law the way it is?"
In addition to chairing the coalition, called the
California Agricultural Issues Forum, Houston is
president of the Kiwifruit Commission.
That commission was handed a court setback
last month with a decision by the state appeals court
in Sacramento on behalf of a kiwifruit
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grower-handler. Houston said the Supreme Court
review "puts the whole thing on hold. We were in
the process of appealing [the kiwifruit case] and will
ask for a reconsideration."
ECONOMIC IMPACT CALLED KEY
Houston said economic impact is key to why the
high court is reviewing the tree fruit case. He said
mandated programs nationwide account for $140
billion annual sales, nationwide advertising
expenditures for mandated programs total up to $1
billion, and there are 170 mandated commodity
programs in the nation, 48 of them in California.
Of California's $19 billion in annual produce,
he said, 70 percent is represented by growers in
mandated programs.
"These programs help to market farm products,
promote consumer education toward healthy eating
and maintain product research and quality
standards," said Bruce Obbink, president of the
California Table Grape Commission based in
Fresno.
Obbink cited a survey done by the coalition
Houston heads. "It found the public strongly
approves and supports" what the boards do, he said.
Obbink said he thinks it unlikely the court could
rule in favor of the growers in the Supreme Court
case. "Otherwise, they could have just let the 9th
Circuit Court ruling stand. The Supreme Court sees
something inequitable here and will try to fix it....
"They could address the free speech issue and
decide what type of speech it is, commercial speech
or free speech. . . . They may decide it is not an
abridgement of free speech. For example, in closed
union shops, people are required to pay into the
union, and must abide by the speech of union
negotiators."
'FORCED ADVERTISING' OPPOSED
One of the plaintiffs in the case, grower Dan
Gerawan, explained his opposition to what he called
"forced generic advertising."
"We have no problem if the industry wants to
voluntarily band together to promote their produce
either generically or on a brand basis through a
co-op," said Gerawan, who grows peaches, plums
and nectarines in the Reedley, Sanger and Fresno
areas. "But when government force is used to
compel someone to spend money to advertise their
product, that is going too far.
"It's somewhat hypocritical for agriculture to
complain we're overregulated in areas of labor,
water and pesticide usage, but then, on the other
hand, to use government force within our own
industry to compel growers to advertise when it may
not be in their best interest."
In response to contentions that the marketing
boards are democratic bodies and "the majority want
to advertise," Gerawan said, "It's up to the Supreme
Court to decide whether individual rights should be
protected from the will of the majority."
Hanford grower John Tos, who supports
marketing orders, said he thinks growers are helped
by them and that their opponents are, for the most
part, "people with an individualistic mentality who
only care about themselves."
"An average grower with 40 acres cannot
conduct research, fund programs at the university
level, hire inspectors to ensure quality produce and
advertise generically across the United States and in
foreign countries," he said.
THE BACKGROUND
The federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 1937, an offspring of New Deal legislation,
gives the U.S. secretary of agriculture considerable
authority to regulate the nation's fruit and vegetable
market through so-called market orders.
The orders primarily are quality-control
measures, but also include assessments imposed on
fruit handlers, based on volume, to pay for
industry-wide administration, inspection, research
and advertising.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott Inc. and other
California fruit growers and shippers began in 1987
withholding the assessments they were required to
pay under the federal marketing orders.
After several rounds of legal maneuvering, a
federal trial judge in 1993 ordered the handlers to
pay $3.1 million in back assessments.
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GALLO'S WHINE
Forbes, Vol. 157, No. 12
Monday, June 17, 1996
Damon Darlin
Dairy farmer and cheesemaker Michael Gallo
figures he spent more than $300,000 last year
advertising that his competitors' cheeses are as good
as his are. -He also spent money to promote milk,
which he doesn't even sell. Why did Gallo spend so
much money so foolishly? Because state and federal
bureaucrats forced him to.
Gallo, the estranged nephew of wine makers
Ernest Gallo and the late Julio Gallo, raises 14,500
dairy cows on a farm midway between Sacramento
and Fresno. It is the largest dairy farm in the U.S.
Gallo uses the cows' milk to make his own "Joseph
Farms" brand of cheese. He'd like consumers to
think his cheese is better than other brands. But
under federal farm laws dating to the 1930s, Gallo
forks over to the National Dairy Board and the
California Milk Advisory Board 15 cents for every
100 pounds of milk his cows give. These
bureaucrats spend the money they collect from Gallo
and other dairy farmers to promote generic dairy
products.
Gripes Gallo: "I have to spend even more on
advertising to overcome what my competitors spend
saying my cheese is the same as all other cheese."
Gallo is now suing state and federal milk marketing
boards, and the state and federal agriculture
departments, which oversee the boards. His
grounds: The involuntary assessments violate his
freedom of speech.
Marketing everything from kiwi fruit to cut
flowers to grape root stock, U.S. commodity boards
throw a lot of money around. Thanks to the coerced
contributions, commodity boards for agricultural
products pull in more than $750 million a year from
U.S. farmers. The federal government plunks down
an additional $90 million of taxpayers' money for
overseas promotions. Does the generic advertising
created by these boards do much for the farmers?
Michael Wohlgenant doesn't think so. An
agricultural economist at North Carolina State
University in Raleigh, he concluded that campaigns
like National Dairy Board's "Got Milk?" can take
credit for increasing milk prices by just 1.3/o--and
demand by a scant 0.3%--between 1984 and 1990.
Remember those California Dancing Raisins
singing "Heard It On The Grapevine?" Brought to
you by the California Raisin Advisory Board, they
were so popular that they eventually had their own
Saturday moming cartoon. But raisin sales declined
during the $20-million- a-year Dancing Raisins
campaign that ran in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Who benefits from the $840 million a year collected
by the various agricultural commodity boards?
Mostly the bureaucrats running the commodity
boards. The California Tree Fruit boards collect
almost $7 million a year from growers, and spend
20% on salaries and expenses for 20 staffers. Some
advertising fimns do pretty well, too. The Fluid Milk
Processors Promotion Board's milk mustache
campaign is an anticipated $165 million national
campaign; assuming the usual industry cut, ad
agency Bozell Worldwide could get over $22
million of that as its fee. (Bozell won't discuss its
fee.)
Farmers like Mike Gallo argue--and in some
earlier cases the courts have agreed--that even if
generic advertising does work, the farmers might be
better off doing their own branded advertising. One
of the biggest innovations in the milk industry has
come from a soft drink maker, Pepsi-Cola Co.,
which is marketing a drink called SmoothMoos
Smoothies that contains 70% milk.
Opined the federal Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals last year in a case against commodity
boards marketing peaches, plums and nectarines:
"We are unwilling to assume, in the absence of hard
evidence to the contrary, that a government agency
is better at marketing than an individual business
person."
The Ninth Circuit court went on to rule that
forcing farmers to contribute to advertising
campaigns violates the farmers' rights of free
speech. But the bureaucrats haven't given up. On
behalf of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the
U.S. Solicitor General is now asking the Supreme
Court to rule that forced contributions are
constitutional. The Supreme Court is expected to
announce in June whether it will hear the case.
(COPYRIGHT 1996 Forbes Inc.) Copyright 1996
Information Access Company. All rights reserved.
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CALIFORNIA'S DANCING RAISINS
Forced Advertising or Generic Marketing?
The Associated Press
Monday, June 3, 1996
Richard Carelli
WASHINGTON (AP) - Tackling a
free-speech dispute over industry wide
advertising, the Supreme Court said Monday
it will decide whether the federal
government can force some fruit growers
and shippers to pay for generic ads.
The justices voted to review a federal
appeals court ruling that said the mandatory
assessments imposed on handlers of
California peaches, plums and nectarines
violated free-speech rights of those more
interested in promoting their own brands.
Such generic ads, which include the
animated and soulful California Raisins, have
become more commonplace in recent years.
Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman
is urging the nation's highest court to reverse
a ruling by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals. The lower court's ruling could end
generic advertising campaigns worth over
$100 million in seven Western states, the
appeal said.
"Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon and Washington have
enacted statutes creating marketing orders or
promotion boards under which generic
promotion of commodities may be
conducted using mandatory assessments,' the
court was told.
Now the high court's ruling, expected
sometime in 1997, will have a national
impact.
The federal Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, an offspring of New
DeaL legislation, -gives.. the secretary of
agriculture considerable authority to regulate
the nation's fruits and vegetables market
through so-called market orders.
The orders primarily are quality-control
measures, but also include assessments
imposed on fruit handlers, based on volume,
to pay for industry-wide administration,
inspection, research and advertising.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott Inc. and other
California fruit growers and shippers began
in 1987 withholding the assessments they
were required to pay under the federal
marketing orders.
After several rounds of legal
maneuvering, a federal trial judge in 1993
ordered the handlers to pay $3.1 million in
back assessments.
The 9th Circuit court reversed that ruling
last year.
"The First Amendment right to freedom
of speech includes a right not to be
compelled to render fmancial support for
others' speech," the appeals court said,
relying on a 1977 Supreme Court decision
that involved use of a union member's dues.
"This is also true when commercial
speech is at issue," the appeals court added.
Coyright 1996 The Associated Press. All
Rights Reserved
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FDA'S TOBACCO AD RULES FACE LENGTHY COURT CHALLENGE
Some Legal Experts Say Restrictions Amount to Unconstitutional
Restraint of Speech
The Washington Post
Saturday, August 24, 1996
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post Staff Writer
Before the Marlboro Man rides off billboards
and Joe Camel disappears -from some magazine
pages, Food and Drug Administration regulations on
tobacco advertising are expected to face a lengthy
challenge in the courts mounted by media companies
and cigarette manufacturers, legal and industry
specialists said yesterday.
Several legal experts and lawyers for
advertising agencies said the rules, which would
allow only black-and-white text advertisements on
billboards and in magazines that have a significant
juvenile readership, amount to an unconstitutional
restraint of speech.
"The government's going to have a real uphill
struggle trying to pass constitutional scrutiny with
this," said Bruce Sanford, a lawyer who specializes
in First Amendment issues with the Washington
office of Baker & Hostetler. The rules "may be
popular, but that doesn't mean they're legal."
A coalition of publishers and advertising
agencies, joined by the tobacco industry, filed suit in
federal court against the proposed regulations last
year, but a judge had effectively put the case on hold
until the rules were finalized. With yesterday's
decision by President Clinton to formally adopt the
FDA regulations, the suit is expected to move
forward.
Advertisements, considered "commercial
speech," have enjoyed growing First Amendment
protection from the courts in recent years. Although
commercial speech still is not protected like other
forms of expression, the Supreme Court this year, in
deciding a Rhode Island liquor advertising case,
rejected the idea of special government restrictions
on ads for "vices."
At the same time, appellate courts have tended
to favor government regulations in cases dealing
with the health and safety of children.
"In cases where juveniles are involved, the
courts are more likely to find a compelling state or
government interest," said Clay Calvert, an assistant
professor of communication at Pennsylvania State
University. "But you've got two big competing
interests here: the health of children and free
speech."
FDA officials contend that the regulations still
will allow tobacco companies to advertise, albeit
without pictures or color, on billboards and in
magazines with a 15 percent or greater juvenile
-readership that are covered by the new rules.
"The companies can still communicate their
speech," said William B. Schultz, the FDA's deputy
commissioner for policy. "We're not regulating the
content of their speech.'
But a spokesman for the advertisers' and
publishers' coalition said that without photos or
graphics, ads are ineffective for an adult audience as
well.
"The way you communicate is by selling a
theme or a feel for a product, by grabbing a
customer's attention," said Washington lawyer John
Fithian, who represents the Freedom to Advertise
Coalition. "Ads which contain no colors and no
pictures amount to no advertisements at all."
Tobacco advertisements in magazines
accounted for $317 million, or about 3 percent of
total advertising revenue last year, according to the
New York-based Magazine Publishers of America.
Industry officials said it will be difficult to
determine which magazines are read by enough
youngsters to fall under the 15 percent rule because
readership among juveniles generally is not
surveyed.
Tobacco ads generated $150 million for
billboard companies last year, about 8 percent to 10
percent of industry revenue, the Outdoor
Advertising Association of America said.
The FDA reguations also would ban tobacco
billboard advertising within 1,000 feet of any
school, doubling the distance of a 500-foot
voluntary industry-wide ban near schools, churches
and parks.
Billboard companies say the 1,000-foot
regulation could amount to a ban on tobacco
billboards in many inner-city areas. "It's not a fair
balance," said Kippy Burns, a spokeswoman for the
outdoor advertising association. "In many areas, it
would blanket an entire community."
Ultimately, legal experts said challenges to the
advertising ban likely will focus extensively on the
medical rationale for the restrictions. "The
government will have to really justify these
restrictions," Sanford said. "That's where the rubber
will hit the road."
Copyright 1996. The Washington Post. All Rights
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